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During the Roman Republic, a dictator usually acted as a temporary military commander 
with supreme authority. When the crisis was over, the dictator resigned, as his term was tightly 
restricted to six-months. The dictatorship was a reliable emergency response for centuries (501-
201 BCE). It appeared regularly from the first decade of the Republic through the Second Punic 
War. Although the job description sounds straightforward, no single fact about the Roman 
dictatorship is easily definable. Traditional arguments about the dictatorship have focused on 
famous military dictators and their tactical actions in battle. This has limited our discussion of 
the dictatorship, which has often led the office to be misunderstood or simplified. The office was 
not static, but constantly adapted. Dictators served in multiple roles during the Republic, 
including completing rituals, holding elections, and calming riots. While modern scholars have 
revealed new nuanced perspectives on the Republic, there has been little update to the 
conventional understanding of the dictatorship. In order to move away from excessively 
legalistic interpretations of the Republic, this study examines the sixty-seven dictators that 
appear in the ancient historian Livy’s comprehensive work. By examining detailed descriptions 
of a variety of dictators, it is possible to reconsider standard notions of the dictatorship. This 
investigation reveals the Roman dictatorship to be a complex and constantly evolving institution, 
which reflected the Republic’s shift from an exclusive aristocracy towards experimenting with 
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In 392 BCE, rumor overwhelmed the city of Rome. According to Livy, “there was 
something like panic” in the streets. An embellished tale of an unsuccessful battle swirled 
throughout the city and terrified the citizens.1 Romans feared that their Etruscan adversaries were 
rapidly approaching the city walls. Frightened women “flocked to the temples,” frantic to gain 
divine protection for their homes.2 Amidst the fearful chaos, Marcus Furious Camillus was 
appointed dictator. Livy wrote that “courage and hope were renewed,” as Camillus’s 
appointment brought instant relief to the city.3 
The new dictator quickly leapt into action. Camillus worked to restore the army’s 
confidence and to conscript new reinforcements. Romans were ready and willing to enlist in the 
fight, and even allies were eager to assist Camillus’s efforts. He soon led his assembled legions 
into a “brilliantly successful” engagement.4 Encouraged by this feat, Camillus turned his 
attention to the Etruscans’ wealthiest city, Veii. He ingeniously organized his men to dig long 
tunnels under Veii’s walls.5 Finally, the dictator made vows to the gods and led his men into the 
enemy city. Pouring over the walls and emerging from the tunnel, they attacked from all sides. A 
“terrible slaughter” ensued and Camillus claimed victory for Rome.6 
The dictator and his men stripped the city of its vast wealth and brought home immense 
spoils. Camillus returned to Rome to celebrate a triumph, a city-wide celebration awarded to a 
                                                            
1 Livy 5. 18.  
2 Livy 5. 18.  
3 Livy 5. 19. 
4 Livy 5. 19. 
5 Livy 5. 19.  
6 Livy 5. 21. 
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conquering general.7 Romans of every class filled the streets in unprecedented numbers to honor 
the dictator. Camillus’s triumphal parade was so impressive that he worried it was impious.8 
After a decade of continuous war fought by lesser commanders, “the world’s greatest general” 
defeated Veii in his single campaign.9  
Although not every Roman dictatorship was as dramatic and glorious, the office played a 
fascinating role in the development of the Republic. Camillus represents only a piece of the 
institution’s complex history. A dictator was an emergency command position that Livy called 
“the usual practice in times of crisis.”10 From disparate sources and fragments of evidence, 
modern scholars have created a basic job description for the office. A typical reference entry 
defines a dictator as six-month emergency military position, appointed to hold complete and 
incontestable authority, alongside a magister equitum to act as second-in-command. After 
centuries of consistent appointments (501-201 BCE), it is usually noted that “the post fell into 
disuse” until Sulla revived the dictatorship in 82 BCE.11 In a final appearance, Caesar 
intermittently used the title of dictator from 49 to 44 BCE.12 These two last dictatorships are 
usually considered to be entirely separate from the dictators of the earlier Republic.13 While there 
are certainly elements of truth in this general discourse, no aspect of the dictatorship can be so 
simply defined.  
Recent scholarship has methodically reconsidered the Roman Republic. Instead of seeing 
a single, fixed Republic founded in 509 and destroyed in the first century BCE, new work aims 
                                                            
7 See Beard, The Roman Triumph; Pittenger, Contested Triumphs. 
8 Livy 5. 22-23. 
9 Livy 5. 23. 
10 Livy 4. 18.  
11 Gizewski, s.v. "Dictator," Gizewski, Brill's New Pauly, 375. 
12 Marcus Antonius formally banned the office after Caesar’s death in 44 BCE. 
13 Drogula, Commanders & Command, 179; Niebuhr, The History of Rome, Volume 1, 498. 
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to highlight the era’s nuances and transformations.14 The office of the dictator, however, has not 
been given the same treatment. Over the Republic’s 500 years, Rome transitioned from the 
domination of a guarded aristocracy towards being swayed by popular sovereignty. Yet, the 
dictatorship is still widely portrayed as a static office, only changed by two power-hungry men, 
Sulla and Caesar, in the late Republic. Scholars focus on one category of dictators, who usually 
fit the ideal archetype of Camillus. There is a decided emphasis on dictators’ tactics and 
maneuvers during combat. A one-dimensional view, built only on the actions of famous 
dictators, does not allow us to track the office’s evolution or complexities. This oversimplified 
interpretation of the dictatorship requires an update. Upon closer examination, the dictatorship 
was implemented for a variety of reasons and developed alongside the Republic.  
Reconsidering the dictatorship, however, is fraught. Records of the early Roman 
Republic are scarce and riddled with mysteries. In this study, I evaluate our understanding of the 
dictatorship using the ancient historian Livy’s account as a foundation. His writing spans the 
early and middle Republic and offers the only surviving record of certain events. Livy’s 
comprehensiveness is an asset in exploring the dictatorship. He allows us to examine a variety of 
less celebrated dictators, the wider context and consequences of dictatorships, and the office’s 
changes throughout the Republic. To challenge the standard narrative of the office, I catalogued 
every dictatorship that Livy mentioned and took note of the conditions surrounding their 
appointment and the usage of their office. This work is referred to throughout and included as an 
appendix.15  
                                                            
14 See historiography discussion in Chapter II, “History and Historiography,” especially Flower, Roman Republics. 
15 Appendix A. 
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Using Livy’s narrative, I reconsider the origins of the office, the men who were 
appointed, the powers of a dictator, the circumstances surrounding appointments, the 
appointment process, ceremonial and religious aspects, the role of the magister equitum, and 
resignations. I find that the Roman dictatorship was decidedly complex and exceptionally 
flexible. Perhaps beyond any other office, the dictatorship of the early Republic was responsive 
to changes in the political system. The dictatorship was, as Livy emphasized, a response to an 
emergency or crisis. Therefore, the office was necessarily adjusted each time it was 
implemented. Each dictator filled Rome’s particular needs at a moment in time. The position was 
adaptable, and therefore mirrors the Republic’s development.  
Academic discussions often attempt to explain the Republic in simple legalistic terms, 
and this restrictive paradigm has also shaped our understanding of the dictatorship. As a result, 
examinations of the office are often filled with inaccurate generalizations. In an attempt to 
approach the dictatorship more holistically, I consider the dictators who completed mundane 
tasks within the city alongside illustrious generals. By expanding rigid definitions of the 
dictatorship, this investigation will also confront conventional ideas about the supposed nature of 
Republican politics. Livy allows us to reconsider assumed facts about the dictatorship. As a 




II. History and Historiography 
The Roman Republic existed for almost 500 years (509-49 BCE).16 Generally, dictators 
are separated between so-called “true Republican dictators” versus the dictatorships of Sulla and 
Caesar.17 This periodization creates one era to encompass every dictator from 501 through 201 
BCE, a total of sixty-seven (in Livy), and a second category that contains only two: Sulla and 
Caesar.18 I find this to be a vast oversimplification, as the dictatorship’s use changed 
significantly before Sulla redefined the office in 82 BCE. The Republic had a considerable 
variety of dictators, allowing us to track a steady evolution from “true Republican dictators,”19 to 
an altered version during the third century BCE’s Second Punic War.  
Livy’s narrative encompassed many periods of political development and innovation. 
Harriet Flower presented a compelling model of multiple sub-stages of the Republic, which can 
help us understand the progression of these changes. According to Flower, after Rome’s regal 
era, there were two Pre-Republic periods of “political experimentation,” followed by a patrician-
centric initial form of the Republic, and finally a more stable system led by a mixed-class 
nobility that existed until approximately 300 BCE.20 The difficult Second Punic War emerged in 
the middle of one more stage, dominated by a further evolution of the nobility. In examining the 
dictatorship, these segments offer a useful timeline. The dictatorship first appeared in Livy 
during a chaotic transitional period and persisted throughout significant reforms to the original 
system. Rome developed from a tight aristocracy towards popular sovereignty. Nonetheless, as 
                                                            
16 Flower, “Introduction,” 2. These are the traditional dates for the Republic, which are debatable.  
17 Sulla and Caesar will not be considered in the body of this study, see Chapter IV “Conclusion” for brief 
discussion; Keyes, “The Constitutional Position of the Roman Dictatorship,” 298. 
18 See Appendix A. 
19 Keyes, “The Constitutional Position of the Roman Dictatorship,” 298-299. Keyes proposed that the dictatorship 
took a new form during the Second Punic War; Golden, Crisis Management, 11-40. Golden also notes the 
dictatorship’s transformations. 
20 Flower, Roman Republics, 48-53. 
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Harris noted, the Republican system is, “not to be confused with democracy.”21 In fact, no 
modern system of government can properly describe the Republic’s complex system. 
Rome lacked a written constitution. This allowed for the constant renegotiation of the 
“calibrated cooperation between Senate, People, and magistrates.”22 Through every stage of the 
Republic, the balance of power continually shifted. Rome’s top magistrates were the two 
consuls, elected each year. The Senate, which was made up of the older elite, generally 
functioned as an advisory board to elected officials. At the beginning of the Republic, all 
political offices were held by wealthy aristocrats, including the dictatorship.23 Religion was 
another key government function, also controlled by the elite.24 Public religion focused on 
safeguarding the city’s future through traditional rituals and ceremonies. To be pious was to 
respect these ancient customs, and in turn Rome won military success.25 In the early Republic, 
the people had little power; they were only able to express opinions through limited and 
regimented participation in assemblies and elections.26 
There were ostensibly two classes at the start of the Republic.27 In basic terms, the 
patricians were the rich and powerful aristocrats, while the plebeians were the lower class 
common people. The plebeians’ political role—and the dictatorship—began to change 
significantly during the height of what is called the Struggle of the Orders. Domestic unrest and 
                                                            
21 Harris, Roman Power, 68. 
22 Eder, “Augustus and the Power of Tradition,” 15; Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 15. This is 
essentially the thesis of Lintott’s entire monograph. 
23 Oakley, “The Early Republic,” 17; Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 32. 
24 Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 198; North, “Democratic Politics,” 17. 
25 Brennan, The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, 38; Harris, Roman Power, 49; Le Bohec, “Roman Wars and 
Armies in Livy,” 117; Scheid, “Livy and Religion,” 82-83; Rüpke, “Communicating with the Gods,” 216. 
26 Mouritsen, Politics in the Roman Republic, 57; North, “Democratic Politics,” 15. 
27 This is a complicated issue, as the actual divisions and differences between these classes are debated. There are no 
definite answers, but for discussions see Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic,” 163-164; Cornell, The 
Beginnings of Rome, 251-265; Forsythe, “The Beginnings of the Republic from 509 to 390 BC,” 317-318. 
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resulting reform characterized this period, which spanned from 494 to 287 BCE.28 The ongoing 
class conflict involved the populace continually pushing for the ruling patricians to pass laws that 
allowed more plebeian rights and admission to offices. This process incrementally gave more 
privilege and political access to the lower class, which transformed Rome’s aristocracy and its 
institutions.29 The tumultuous politics of this conflict produced a new blended nobility.  
Another significant moment in the Republic’s history came during the third century BCE. 
In 218-201 BCE, Rome fought the Second Punic War against Carthage. This war operated at an 
unprecedented scale, challenging Rome’s usual military success. Brennan fittingly called the 
war, “virtually one continuous state of emergency,” which naturally led to changes in political 
practice.30 Unsurprisingly, dictators were appointed regularly during these seventeen years of 
conflict. Rome was also experimenting with new forms of power during this time, as well as 
extensions of command.31 Additionally, the Senate took a more influential and involved role in 
the third century BCE, likely in response to the traumatic war.32 The last dictator (before Sulla) 
appeared in 201 BCE, the final year of the Second Punic War.33 By this juncture, the Republic 
had changed considerably from its foundation. Even still, scholars routinely fail to acknowledge 
any variation in the dictatorship. Current research generally agrees that the Republic constantly 
evolved, yet dictators are often excluded from this model of perpetual transformation. 
The dictatorship occupies an odd space within Roman historiography. It appears in nearly 
every piece of writing or record about the Republic, but complex discussions are limited. In part, 
                                                            
28 Oakley, “The Early Republic,” 17-19. 
29 The extent of these conflicts is debated, see Forsythe, “The Beginnings of the Republic from 509 to 390 BC,” 317; 
Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 237-344; Raaflaub, “Between Myth and History,” 141. 
30 Brennan, “Power and Process,” 57. 
31 Rich, “Fear, Greed, and Glory,” 50-51; Brennan, “Power and Process,” 39-40; Lintott, The Constitution of the 
Roman Republic, 113. 
32 Brennan, The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, 33. 
33 Livy 30. 39-40. 
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this is because, as Christian Gizewski in Brill’s New Pauly aptly defined, the history of the 
Roman dictatorship is “shrouded in mystery.”34 When scholars present the office in greater 
detail, they often portray the dictatorship as antithetical to the Republican political system, which 
otherwise emphasized shared power and restrictions on magistrates.35 The office is often 
presented as a deviation from Roman values. This traditional model of the dictatorship comes 
from Theodor Mommsen’s History of Rome, his canonical work published in three volumes over 
1854-1856 (in the original German). Mommsen stated that a dictator was meant to, “revive 
temporarily the regal authority,” and had disdain for the institution’s similarity to kingship.36 He 
saw dictators as counter to the Rome’s careful divisions of power. In his mind, the Republic’s 
system of checks and balances led to the eventual abandonment of the “all-along unpopular 
institution” of the dictatorship.37 Mommsen defined Roman politics in narrowly legalistic terms, 
frequently focused on class divisions.38 He often reduced political action to elite ambition or 
class warfare. This lens is unsurprising, as Mommsen’s work came less than a decade after Karl 
Marx’s Communist Manifesto, written in 1848. Mommsen saw the dictatorship as an oppressive 
tool of the elite. While he was correct that the office was tied to the aristocracy, his contempt for 
the dictator’s individual power produced a simplistic viewpoint. Mommsen viewed Rome’s 
political history as a linear march away from monarchy, which led him to inaccurately 
characterize the dictatorship as an anomaly from usual practice.39  
                                                            
34 Gizewski, “Dictator,” 375. For discussion of the institution’s history, see Chapter III-a “The Origins of the 
Institution.”  
35 Cohen, “The Origin of the Roman Dictatorship,” 303; Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 227; Mommsen, History 
of Rome: Volume 1, 251. 
36 Mommsen, History of Rome: Volume 1, 252. 
37 Mommsen, History of Rome: Volume 3, 56. 
38 Jehne, “Methods, Models, and Historiography,” 33. 
39 Mommsen, The History of Rome: Volume 1, 252, 296, 335. 
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Mommsen’s interpretation continues to permeate modern study. Any scholar who writes 
about the dictatorship unavoidably addresses Mommsen and must accept or reject certain 
specifics of his argument. While the dictatorship is still widely treated as irregular, nuance has 
been added to Mommsen’s depiction of the office. The Roman dictatorship is no longer utterly 
villainized. Yet, it is still seen as abnormal because it was non-collegial and granted total power. 
T.J. Cornell called the office a “partial exception” to Rome’s balance of power. He wrote that the 
dictator and his magister equitum were a “remarkable set of institutions.” Cornell found that the 
dictator’s role as an emergency response with a six-month term “had no parallel…in Italy or 
anywhere else in the Mediterranean.”40 Similarly, Gregory K. Golden called it a “most unusual 
Roman magistracy.”41 Just as Mommsen was colored by the politics of his time, newer 
interpretations often suffer from perpetuating what William Harris called, “Rome’s imaginary 
democracy.”42 In the same vein, John A. North warned that democracy was “explosive 
terminology” which produces misinterpretations of the Republic.43 Harris and North were 
principally reacting to Fergus Millar, who emphasized the democratic role of the people in the 
Republic.44 While Rome certainly made strides towards popular sovereignty during the Republic, 
it was far from any modern conception of a democracy.45 The dictatorship was not an aberration, 
but symptomatic of an aristocratic system. While scholars now acknowledge the ambiguous 
aspects of the office, there has been little redefinition of our understanding of dictators. 
Many of the dictatorship’s obscurities stem from absent source material. Unfortunately, 
the early history of Rome is challenging to study. The ancient sources are not only limited in 
                                                            
40 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 226-227.  
41 Golden, Crisis Management, 11. 
42 Harris, Roman Power, 10-11. 
43 North, “Democratic Politics,” 15. 
44 Millar, The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic. 
45 Harris, Roman Power, 68. 
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number, but also obscured by missing information and elements of myth.46 Key records come 
from the fasti, lists of elected officials and public events, that formed a general outline of Roman 
political history.47 A few narrative accounts have survived, but are also incomplete. The Greek 
historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus wrote Roman Antiquities, which covered the founding myth 
through 264 BCE. Unfortunately, we only have his full account through 443 BCE.48 He wrote at 
roughly the same time as Livy, covering much of the same material, but with a different aim.49 
Besides the obvious gaps in information, scholars also find that Dionysus’s account was clouded 
by an overt focus on the Greek role in Roman developments.50 Other notable ancient historians, 
like Polybius, do not cover the early Republican period, which was a vital time for the 
development of the Roman dictatorship.51 
A crucial account of this era comes from Roman historian Livy, who lived between 59 
BCE–17 CE. Although only thirty-five of one hundred and forty-two volumes have survived, 
Livy’s Books from the Foundation of the City (Ab urbe condita libri) offer one of the most 
comprehensive histories of early Rome.52 Unlike many historians of the time, he “led a quiet and 
regular existence,” and never served in political office or the army.53 Livy seems to have spent a 
considerable amount of his life living and writing in Rome, essentially a career historian. 54 As a 
                                                            
46 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 57; Oakley, “The Early Republic, 15-16; Armstrong, War and Society, 1-8.  
47 See Appendix B for discussion of fasti; Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 13; Armstrong, War and Society, 26-
27; Livy perhaps preferred fasti to other sources, see Syme, “Livy and Augustus,” 69. 
48 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 2. 
49 Forsythe, “The Beginnings of the Republic from 509 to 390 BC,” 315; Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 2. 
50 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 37; Culham, “Women in the Roman Republic,” 140.  
51 At least, the period is not covered in surviving work. For discussion of Polybius, see Lintott, The Constitution of 
the Roman Republic, 16-26.  
52 Livy’s life is the subject of debate, see Levick, “Historical Context of the Ab Urbe Condita,” 25; The number of 
volumes could also be as high as 150, see Bessone, “The Periochae,” 435; Briscoe, "Livy," 376. As seen here, even 
in reference works Livy is cited as the standard for the era. 
53 Syme, “Livy and Augustus,” 27. Despite the significance of his work, only the broad strokes of Livy’s personal 
history are known. The limited sources indicate that he was born in Patavium, modern Padua in Italy. 
54 Syme, “Livy and Augustus,” 27. 
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result, Livy’s writing provides an extensive body of work, but lacks a grounding in practical 
experience, especially in military affairs. As P.G. Walsh described, “the wonder is that being 
neither Senator nor soldier nor avid traveller he got so much right.”55 This investigation of the 
dictatorship, however, is concerned with political evolutions, not the minutiae of combat. 
Subsequently, any of Livy’s inaccurate portrayals of warfare bear little importance.  
Thematically, Livy’s primary concern was the decline of Roman morality. Leaning on his 
study of philosophy, he emphasized emotion and historical characters, and employed a variety of 
paraphrased speeches, which crafted moral lessons for readers.56 Like any historian, his writing 
was undoubtedly influenced by the problems of his day. During Livy’s time, the Republic was in 
almost complete disintegration.57 In the aftermath of the civil wars that rocked the first century 
BCE, Livy was seeking to redefine a muddled “Roman national identity.”58 As he wrote, a period 
of disorder was capped by the rise of the emperor Augustus. Living under the new stability of a 
nascent imperial system, it is not unthinkable that Livy appreciated, or at least accepted, 
individual rule. Livy had a controversial (and much debated) association with Augustus, 
although the nature of their relationship is unclear, and perhaps even fraught.59 A shared 
reverence for Republican values meant that Livy and Augustus both idealized early Rome, which 
was likely their main connection.60 The problems Livy saw in his own time made him nostalgic 
                                                            
55 Walsh, “Livy,” 115-142. 
56 Ogilvie, “Introduction,” 12; Syme, “Livy and Augustus,” 72; Walsh, “Livy,” 121, 129. 
57 Levick, “Historical Context of the Ab Urbe Condita,” 25. 
58 Pittenger, Contested Triumphs, 2. 
59 This connection may have allowed him access to more records, but also brings up issues of bias. There are many 
different discussions, see Ogilvie, “Introduction,” 11. Syme, “Livy and Augustus,” 64, 66; Le Bohec, “Roman Wars 
and Armies,” 130; Levick, “Historical Context of the Ab Urbe Condita,” 25-34; Walsh, “Livy,” 120; Mineo, “Livy’s 
Political and Moral Values and the Principate,” 126-136. Mineo does not cast Livy as a fervent supporter, but 
“perfectly aware” of Augustus’s “political exploitation.” 
60 Gaertner "Livy's Camillus,” 28; Levick, “Historical Context of the Ab Urbe Condita,” 34; Pittenger, Contested 
Triumphs, 14-15; Walsh, “Livy,” 120; For Augustus’s use of the early Republic see Tacitus, Annals, 1.3; Harris, 
Roman Power, 100; Eder, “Augustus and the Power of Tradition,” 15. 
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for the piety and ethics that he found (or created) in the stories about the early Republic.61 Heroic 
leaders like Camillus showed immense restraint and commitment to the state despite their 
substantial power.  
Despite his usefulness, scholars often criticize Livy for inconsistent use of sources. In 
some cases, he seemed to omit, alter, or perhaps misinterpret information.62 Livy himself 
admitted that the events of his first five books (753-386 BCE) are “like objects dimly perceived 
in the far distance," based on “few written records.”63 He blamed the lack of solid information on 
a fire during the Gallic Sack of Rome in 386 BCE, which burned many documents.64 In spite of 
such limitations, Livy’s history is uniquely expansive, simply unmatched by contemporaries.65 
Even though his speeches and stories contain many creative liberties, they are meant to teach a 
lesson and therefore reveal a set of Roman ideals.66 Livy’s history is not definitive, but his access 
to records and viewpoint offer invaluable insight into how Romans viewed their political systems 
and its history, including the dictatorship. Livy’s perspective as a Roman gave him value as a 
cultural resource, which offers a distinct view from Greek historians like Polybius or Dionysius 
of Halicarnassus. 67 Livy’s surviving work included a dictator about every three years, providing 
an excellent window into the office’s role within Rome’s greater history.68 Jaeger fittingly wrote 
                                                            
61 Walsh, “Livy,” 119. 
62 Syme, “Livy and Augustus,” 57; Gaertner, "Livy's Camillus,” 43; Drummond, “The Dictator Years,” 552; Levene, 
“Allusions and Intertextuality,” 211. 
63 Livy 6. 1. 
64 Livy 6 .1. The same fire is blamed for the loss of many early Roman records, including additional fasti; Badian, 
“The Early Historians,” 2; Armstrong, War and Society, 242-244. Armstrong used Plutarch to argue that better 
records post-Gallic sack are actually because of improved bureaucracy, not a fire.   
65 Walsh, “Livy,” 129. 
66 Pittenger, Contested Triumphs, 20. 
67 It is also important to acknowledge the inherent difficulties of working with a translated text. This study works 
with an English translation of Livy’s original Latin work. There is certainly debate within the field about appropriate 
translation of various passages or phrases. Consideration of semantics is not absent in this study, as the scholarly 
work I reference frequently examines the original Latin. When necessary, I implement Latin words or phrases, 
especially for key terminology. Additional explanation of these terms is provided in the footnotes when appropriate. 
68 See Appendix A. We have dictators in Livy from 501-302 BCE (199 years) plus 217-201 BCE (sixteen years), 
meaning sixty-seven dictators over 215 years, which averages to a dictator about every 3.2 years. Golden (Crisis 
13 
 
that Livy “creates and maintains a sense of crisis.” 69 This attention to catastrophe lends itself to a 
study of an emergency position. In short, Livy’s retrospective narrative of the dictatorship is 
suited to the task of examining important evolutions in the politics of the Roman Republic.  
  
                                                            
Management, 25) found a similar statistic, even though his study of the dictatorship is not centered on Livy, and at 
times omits certain categories of dictator. 
69 Jaeger, Livy’s Written Rome, 8. 
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III. Livy’s Dictators 
In order to illuminate the dictatorship’s role within the Republic, this study examines the 
peculiarities and debates surrounding the various facets of the position. This chapter deals with 
eight aspects of the dictatorship. Each section aims to reconsider canonical notions of the 
dictatorship with a close reading of Livy’s history. By investigating the specifics of how and why 
the dictatorship was implemented, we can better understand the office’s complexity, highlight 
openings for further research, and reveal features of the Republican system that are often 
overlooked. 
a. The Origins of The Institution 
Modern historians do not know the precise origin of the dictatorship.70 It appears that 
many ancient historians were likewise in the dark. Livy’s first dictator took office in 501 BCE, 
less than a decade after the fall of Rome’s monarchy.71 Although he recounted the story of this 
dictatorship, Livy admitted that the exact name and identity were disputed even among early 
historians.72 The question of the dictatorship’s early history is still unsolved. Mommsen 
definitively classified the office as a Republican creation, which set the standard for 
contemporary scholars.73 Mommsen’s work emphasized a “doubtless” link between dictatorial 
and consular powers, which suggested the offices were created concurrently at the start of the 
Republic (traditionally 509 BCE).74 This viewpoint has undoubtedly colored subsequent 
discussions. Even so, newer research indicates that the dictatorship may predate the Republic. 
There are even indications of this in Livy, although he probably had little to no knowledge of 
                                                            
70 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 227-228. 
71 Livy 2. 18. 
72 Livy 2. 18; Ridley, “The Origin of the Roman Dictatorship,” 303-304. 
73 Mommsen, History of Rome: Volume 1, 252. 
74 Mommsen, History of Rome: Volume 1, 252; Ridley, “The Origin of the Roman Dictatorship,” 304. Ridley 
provides a discussion of Mommsen’s influence on the arguments; see also de Wilde, “The Dictator’s Trust,” 560. 
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pre-Republican dictators (who came before both consuls and the fasti).75 In current scholarship, a 
variety of theories have emerged to explain the dictatorship’s true origins. This debate is 
emblematic of issues in the discourse surrounding the dictatorship, and the Republic more 
broadly. Mommsen and his contemporaries offered valuable contributions to the field, but often 
resorted to simplified accounts that relied on Roman exceptionalism. The conversation 
surrounding the origins of the dictatorship demonstrates the value in questioning canonical 
explanations of the Republic.  
Mommsen’s view was built on the assumption that after the expulsion of the last king, 
Rome quickly replaced the monarchy with two annually-elected consuls.76 Mommsen reasoned 
that the two consuls represented the division of the king’s power (imperium) into two officials.77 
Consuls, however, were not kings. Consuls were not only restricted by yearly terms, but each 
also by their colleague.78 Livy stressed that “positions of political eminence could not be limited 
in the scope of their jurisdiction, but they could be limited in duration,” which is reflected in both 
the annual consulship and the six-month dictatorship.79 Romans felt a theoretical safety in term 
limits, which helps to explain how the dictatorship could have existed in the aftermath of a fallen 
monarchy. Following Mommsen’s logic, the imperium of a dictator was akin to a king, but this 
was permissible because his tenure was tightly restricted.80 There is a substantial flaw in this 
                                                            
75 Livy (6. 1) himself admitted his records for the regal period and early Republic are unreliable at best; Ridley, 
“The Origin of the Roman Dictatorship,” 303; Livy’s first dictator, in 501 BCE, was perhaps the first that appeared 
in his source material. 
76 Livy 1. 60. Livy does not acknowledge a transitional period.  
77 Mommsen, History of Rome: Volume 1, 246; Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 95; North, “The 
Constitution of the Roman Republic,” 264; For opposition, see Drogula, Commanders & Command, 13. 
78 Brennan, “Power and Process,” 37. 
79 Livy 4. 24; See also Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 226.  
80 Mommsen, History of Rome, 252; For more on term length, see Chapter III-h “Leaving Office.” 
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logic. While Romans may have accepted the dictatorship at the start of the Republic, it seems 
highly dubious that a new form of individual rule was created in this era. 
Following the traditional timeline, the Republic was born out of anti-regal insurrection. 
By most accounts, the Republic began after an aristocratic coup in 509 BCE.81 In Livy, the 
Roman kings are largely depicted as oppressive. His history presented an ongoing disdain for 
royalty, with declarations like, “the poorest in Rome hated the very name of ‘king’ as bitterly as 
did the great.”82 It is additionally important to note that the Republic would have been 
established in the wake of the last king, Tarquinius Superbus. Tarquin was notorious for his 
exceptionally domineering regime.83 If this is true, the Roman Republic was born in a time that 
deeply distrusted monarchical government. The dictatorship was a position which trusted a 
supreme individual ruler. It seems unlikely that an institution of this sort would not have been 
introduced directly after ousting an oppressive leader.84 Consequently, it seems probable that the 
office, or some version of it, was in use before the overthrow. 
Alternatively, the idea of a dramatic coup in 509 BCE may be misguided. While we have 
acknowledged that the Republic was perpetually shifting, it is necessary to consider that the regal 
era was just as dynamic. Modern scholars find that the Republic emerged more incrementally, 
with several stages between absolute monarchy and the first consuls.85 Somewhere in this 
                                                            
81 Livy 1. 60. Livy states that the kingship lasted for 244 years from the founding, which would be 753-509 BCE; 
This date is confirmed in Flower, The Roman Republic, 365; Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 215; Rosenstein, 
“Republican Rome,” 193; For further discussion of chronology for regal period see Mastrocinque, “Tarquin the 
Superb,” 307-308. 
82 Livy also described more moderate or well-liked kings, see Livy 2. 9. 
83 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 120-121; Livy 1. 49. 
84 Cohen, “The Origin of the Roman Dictatorship,” 318. Cohen argued that despite the dictator’s similarity to a king, 
the dictatorship had religious connections that allowed it to continue from monarchy to Republic.  
85 Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 31; Drogula, Commanders & Command, 18, 20; Flower, 
“Introduction,” 14-15; Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 227-239. Cornell debated the issue but did not necessarily 
pick a side. 
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process, the dictatorship may have been created to bridge the gap between king and consuls.86 
The titles of praetor maximus and magister populi come from the regal era and may suggest 
dictator prototypes.87 Magister populi, which can be translated as “master of the citizen army,” 
(hence military commander) is also used to refer the dictatorship.88 Before the Republic, a 
magister populi may have been appointed for life, meaning the dictatorship may be a modified 
version of this office.89 It has also been postulated that a praetor maximus was an “annual official 
appointed by the king,” who eventually took over.90 The most compelling case for the dictator’s 
development from praetor maximus appears in Livy. He wrote about a pre-Republic religious 
ritual, to be completed by a “chief magistrate,” or praetor maximus.91 This ceremonial duty was 
carried out by dictators during the Republic, perhaps linking the two positions.92 If nothing else, 
Livy indicated a lineage between dictators and the old position of praetor maximus. Even if the 
praetor maximus and magister populi were not direct antecedents of the dictator, it is reasonable 
that the office evolved from one (or both) of these models. Basically, there may have been a 
transitional stage between kings and consuls, in which some early prototype of the dictatorship 
ruled over Rome.93 From this practice, the dictator and his magister equitum may have served as 
a model for the collegiate consuls.94  
                                                            
86 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 227-228; supported by evidence of Latin influence, see Ridley, “The Origin of 
the Roman Dictatorship,” 304; Keyes, “The Constitutional Position of the Roman Dictatorship,” 303; Brennan, The 
Praetorship in The Roman Republic, 261. 
87 I necessarily only scratch the surface of these debates, for which Latinists have produced many compelling 
arguments, Cornell offers a thorough exploration of both terms, see Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 139-140, 220-
237. 
88 Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 110. Livy uses derivatives of dictator while other ancient sources 
use magister populi; Mommsen, History of Rome: Volume 1, 252. 
89 The term magister populi is a complex topic, for which there is not space to explicate fully here, see Cornell, The 
Beginnings of Rome, 139-140.  
90 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 227-228. 
91 Livy 7. 3. This odd law is discussed in longer form in Chapter III-d “Circumstances for Appointments.” 
92 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 139-140, 237. It may also have originally referred to a different position from 
the regal era; Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 110. 
93 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 227-228; Brennan, The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, 22. 
94 Brennan, The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, 22. 
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This interpretation also requires a more measured view of the kings. If Rome’s kings 
were universally hated (as Mommsen told us), the dictatorship would not have been a favorable 
option. While later kings certainly seem ruthless, some early monarchs appear to have been well-
regarded leaders.95 Despite many statements against monarchy, Livy also credited the stability of 
the strong kingship for allowing Rome to become “a politically adult nation.”96 Without the 
guidance of a strong leader, he felt Rome would have succumbed to the “stormy sea of 
democratic politics.”97 In this way, the dictatorship may have been a natural evolution of Rome’s 
leadership. The shared power of consuls, not the dictatorship, was a drastically new form of rule. 
Even amid the chaos of a new system, Rome may have used the familiar solitary power of a 
dictatorship as backup plan. So, perhaps Romans were not hatefully afraid of kings, but simply 
experimenting with new systems of governance  
Current research also suggests that the dictatorship was not an entirely Roman creation. 
Cornell found that Rome’s temporary dictatorship appears to be unique, but annual dictators 
were used in nearby communities.98 Unlike in Rome, it seems that other Latin dictators were a 
normal function of government, not an emergency protocol.99 Livy’s text may confirm this 
influence from Latin and Greek political practices. Livy specifically mentioned an Alban dictator 
being used after their king’s death in 760 BCE.100 Ridley argued that Livy actually meant to 
                                                            
95 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 121, 149. 
96 Livy 2. 1. 
97 Livy 2. 1. Specifically, Livy used democracy in negative context, to say that without kingship Rome would have 
been destroyed by a sort of mob rule à la Athenian democracy. 
98 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 145-146, 227- 233. 
99 Cohen, “The Origin of the Roman Dictatorship,” 300; Keyes, “The Constitutional Position of the Roman 
Dictatorship,” 304. 
100 Livy 1. 23. Although, “dictator” in this context can also be translated as “supreme commander,” which comes 
with its own set of implications; Livy 5. 19-23. There are also traces of Greek influence in Livy’s writing, like the 
Battle of Veii, which seems to mirror the story of the Trojan War, see Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 312. 
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imply that the Roman dictatorship was taken from a Latin model.101 Regardless, substituting a 
king for a dictator likely had precedent in the Latin world. It is difficult to argue that Rome was 
not influenced by nearby political practices. Undeniably, Rome borrowed and modified other 
state’s political institutions and symbology, even in its the earliest days.102 Consequently, the 
Roman dictatorship could have been conceived much before the existence of Republic.  
By reconsidering the dictatorship’s origins, we also challenge many canonical ideas about 
the Republic’s creation. Dating the dictatorship to a messy period of political formation, or even 
prior, is a move away from Roman exceptionalism. Mommsen and early writers tended to think 
of Roman politics as self-contained, an argument which failed to address outside influences.103 
Ignoring external inspiration allows writers to perpetuate Rome’s supremacy over neighboring 
states, despite evidence to the contrary. The Republic and its institutions were not created in a 
vacuum. The dictatorship seems to have a long history, perhaps even older than the Republic. 
Mommsen confined the dictatorship (and the Republic) to an event, rather than a process. While 
tidy, this logic generalizes a complicated period of development and limits our understanding of 
the Roman Republic. The traditional view tends to isolate the dictatorship from Rome’s normal 
political evolution, which misses the fundamental fact that Rome did not suddenly become a 
democratic state after banishing the kings. The Romans also did not instantaneously create a 
fully-formed Republic, nor a refined dictatorship. By viewing the dictatorship as emergent, 
                                                            
101 Ridley, “The Origin of the Roman Dictatorship,” 308; Livy 2. 18. Livy may have been unaware of earlier 
dictators, but his narrative still offers indications of pre-Republican dictators. He wrote that the first dictator 
“alarmed” Rome’s enemies. This indicates the Roman dictator already had a regional reputation, perhaps suggesting 
a pre-Republican origin.  
102 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 230-232; Flower, “Introduction,” 7-8; North, “Democratic Politics,” 13; 
103 For discussion of influences see Ridley, “The Origin of the Roman Dictatorship,” 304; Cornell, The Beginnings 
of Rome, 227; Keyes, “The Constitutional Position of the Roman Dictatorship,” 303; Livy also habitually fell into 
the same trap, see Jaeger, Livy’s Written Rome, 6. 
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rather than exceptional, we can additionally reconsider conventional simplifications of the 
Republic.  
b. The Men Who Became Dictator 
The appointment of a dictator entrusted an individual with considerable power. The 
office’s resemblance to kingship often leads it to be miscategorized as antithetical to Republican 
values. Mommsen, for example, portrayed the dictatorship as, “the palladium of the conservative 
party.”104 In the tradition of Mommsen, Drogula described the office as oppressively 
conservative, calling it “the equivalent of a declaration of martial law.”105 This severe depiction 
of the dictatorship may stem from misunderstanding the Republic as a democracy. Especially in 
the early Republic, Rome was closely controlled by a small cluster of elite. Dictators (and all 
politicians) were from this set of privileged patricians.106 Even when power was technically 
shared between magistrates, authority remained in the same set of hands. In Livy’s account, the 
dictatorship was the standard emergency response.107 Much closer to Livy, Cornell referred to 
the office as a “partial exception” from normal distributions of power.108 Contrary to many 
discussions, a temporary switch to individual power was not actually a risk or shift in the power 
structure. 
Upon closer examination, the dictatorship was not a deviation from the ordinary course of 
Roman politics. The concept of fides, or trust, was essential to the general function of the 
Republic.109 The ruling class trusted one another to act in the best interest of the state. The 
                                                            
104 Mommsen, History of Rome: Volume 2, 284. 
105 Drogula, Commanders & Command, 338. 
106 Oakley, “The Early Republic,” 17; Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 32. 
107 Livy 4. 18. “The usual practice in times of crisis.” 
108 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 227. 
109 Trust is not a perfect translation, as fides also included unspoken expectations for behavior; de Wilde, “The 
Dictator’s Trust,” 557; Le Bohec, “Roman Wars and Armies,” 118, 132. 
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expectations that accompanied this trust were especially important for the informal regulation of 
individuals who held power. Political offices rotated frequently, recycling what Pittenger called a 
set of “functionally interchangeable” elite men.110 A typical career politician held a variety of 
offices. There are countless examples in Livy. He mentioned men such as Gaius Junius 
Bubulcus, who held office as consul, censor, and twice as dictator.111 Even still, the nomination 
of a dictator was not taken lightly.  
The dictatorship was a particularly revered appointment. Perhaps even more exclusive 
than the consulship, it was reserved for established politicians.112 Livy told us that dictators were 
frequently former consuls, especially in later years.113 He did not always specify that a dictator 
had previously been consul, perhaps because his audience would have found this information 
redundant.114 Dictators had all served in some significant capacity, sometimes adjacent to the 
dictatorship as a previous magister equitum.115 Particularly in the guarded aristocracy of the early 
Republic, dictators regularly took the office multiple times, and their sons often followed in their 
footsteps. In a prominent example, Camillus was made dictator five times, and his son later 
served twice.116 Consistently, the office was held by seasoned politicians. Livy repeatedly 
indicated that dictators were respected and renowned. He often lauded appointees; he called one 
                                                            
110 Pittenger, Contested Triumphs, 297. 
111 Livy 10. 1-2. 
112 de Wilde, “The Dictator’s Trust,” 558; This protection was possible in part because dictators were not elected but 
appointed by consul. The actual fairness of elections is very questionable, but selecting dictators in this time had no 
illusion of popular choice. 
113 Livy 2. 18. Livy may indicate that dictators had to be former consuls, he stated that dictators had to be “of 
consular rank.” This may simply mean that a man was required to have the same status as a consul, as it is especially 
unlikely in the early republic that the pool of former consuls was large enough to appoint many different dictators; 
Other former consuls appear in Livy 7 .38, 9. 29, 10. 1; In two cases, a current consul was made dictator: Livy 8. 12, 
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114 Livy specifically mentioned six former (and one current) consuls at the time of appointment, see previous. 
Although, many others can be seen serving as consul before or after their dictatorships despite no acknowledgement.  
115 Examples appear in Livy 4. 26, 6. 28, 29. 10. 
116 Marcus Furius Camillus: Livy 5. 19-23, 5. 46-55, 6. 2-4, 6. 38, 6. 42; Lucius Furius Camillus: Livy 7. 24-25, 7. 
28; de Wilde, “The Dictator’s Trust,” 559. de Wilde also noted Camillus’s many dictatorships, but questions if all 
five are real. 
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a “true prophet,” another was, “by the far the most distinguished soldier at the time,” and another 
still was “regarded as foremost in military matters.”117 The men who served as dictator were not 
mysterious figures. Any man with high enough standing to reach the dictatorship was already 
vetted within the political community, either by blood or career (often both). While relatively 
uncommon, the dictatorship was an attainable goal in a powerful Roman’s political career.  
Accordingly, naming a dictator was not quite a leap of faith, at least during the early 
Republic. The early ruling class was an especially tight group, which made (temporary) 
individual power a safe option. The entire political community was small and homogenous; most 
offices were seemingly held by a few established wealthy families.118 Consuls sometimes 
appointed political allies to the dictatorship, or even a family member.119 The aristocracy was 
also relatively unified in the early Republic, both politically and socially.120 The dictatorship’s 
solitary power underlined this unity, providing a strong illustration of fides.121 Appointing a 
dictator was also a means to manage substandard politicians. Admission into politics was 
predicated on heredity, not skill.122 Thus, a dictatorship allowed the aristocracy to reinstate a 
proven politician when an incompetent consul was in office. The nomination of a dictator was a 
useful option in this climate; the elite were able to appoint a trusted man from within their ranks, 
easily streamlining the governmental response to emergency.  
Nonetheless, there were a few exceptions. I found Livy to mention only three plebeian 
dictators, and all met considerable resistance from the aristocratic establishment.123 In 357 BCE, 
                                                            
117 Livy 4. 46, 8. 29, 9. 38. 
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Livy described Rome’s first plebeian dictator, who was slowed down substantially by patrician 
hostility.124 One plebeian dictator was appointed during his own consulship. An odd situation, 
but also an illustration of how difficult it was for a plebeian to ascend to the dictatorship.125 
These exclusionary norms were not limited to the dictatorship, by any means. All other political 
positions were also notably aristocratic until the Struggle of the Orders.126  
After the class reformations in the fourth century BCE, a new nobility was formed, 
distinct from the early Republic’s strictly hereditary elite. In this system, individual power was 
not as straightforward. The nobilitas included many wealthy plebeians.127 The new nobility was 
less homogenous, larger, and somewhat less harmonious.128 Positions were open to a greater 
number of Roman men, increasing competition. While there were still advantages for established 
families within the nobilitas, the highest offices were no longer inherited.129 Instead of relying on 
family legacy, competition ensured that Rome had quality magistrates. The Republic was still 
not a democracy but was nonetheless becoming more inclusive. Trust was a less significant 
factor, because officials needed to prove themselves in order to be elected. Livy’s last dictator 
appeared in 201 BCE.130 By this time, the new ruling class was firmly established.  
Mommsen believed that the dictatorship was abandoned after the third century BCE 
because Romans loathed it,131 but this is unlikely. The dictatorship was probably not rejected, but 
may have ceased to be a practical option. Rome was no longer controlled by a tight circle of elite 
families. The pool of potential nominees was much larger and political interests were more 
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125 Livy 8. 12. 
126 The exception being plebeian tribunes, but this was not a particularly powerful office.  
127 Mouritsen, Politics in the Roman Republic, 95. 
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varied. Appointing an individual commander was much more efficient and reliable within the 
previous cohesive ruling class. Selecting a dictator in the new nobility would have been much 
more complicated, and potentially controversial, as Rome was no longer controlled by a small 
community of aristocrats. Understandably, individual power was probably far less attractive.  
Whereas some define the dictatorship’s abandonment as a bold rejection of aristocracy, it 
was truly just a natural political evolution. In the early Republic’s protected political ecosystem, 
individuals from the small political community could be routinely trusted with supreme 
power.132 Livy illustrated that the dictatorship did not represent a deviation from the early 
aristocracy’s power structure. After the nobilitas emerged, the political system was much more 
discordant. As a result, the politics of appointing a dictator were less clear cut. The dictatorship 
was not uniquely undemocratic or repressive, but rather reflected the deeply aristocratic and 
impenetrable political system of the early Republic. Furthermore, individual power did not 
represent a substantial change, as the patrician men who served as dictator were already 
“entrenched”133 in the system.  
c. Power and Imperium  
Dictators held imperium, a highly debated concept. In the simplest of reference 
definitions, imperium was the “general military power of command.”134 This legal power of 
command was invested in Rome’s highest offices, including the consuls, praetors, and the 
dictator. Military authority was implicit to imperium, but its other dimensions were more 
complex.135 The precise nature of imperium is an immense topic, which has received extensive 
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scholarly discussion.136 In particular, the dictator’s imperium is incredibly unclear. Due to scarce 
information, scholars generally define the dictator’s imperium via comparison to that of the 
consulship. This proves to be the most discussed area of the dictatorship; scholars have debated a 
dictator’s imperium and his relationship to the consuls ad nauseum.137 The inconsistences in 
discussions of imperium are probably not due to faulty information or interpretations, but 
because imperium was not a static concept.138 Even if we could pin down the specifics of a 
dictator’s imperium, it would only represent a specific moment in time. Imperium gave power to 
Rome’s top political figures, meaning it needed to change alongside the political system. Livy 
described enactments of imperium, which allows us to consider the practical implications of the 
dictator’s powers. A strict legalistic definition is not necessary, as Livy demonstrates that a 
dictator’s effective power was ultimately supreme.  
Scholars have created numerous arguments surrounding the dictator’s imperium. There is 
particular controversy over Livy’s use of the term maius imperium, or greater imperium.139 
Multiple scholars have taken Livy’s usage of maius imperium to indicate that early dictators had 
a unique, uppermost grade of imperium.140 By this logic, early dictators actually had a higher 
level of imperium than both consuls and third century BCE dictators.141 Alternatively, Brennan 
argued that Livy’s claims of greater imperium are a misunderstanding.142 Brennan maintained 
that a dictator and the consuls had equal imperium. He suggested that a dictatorship may even 
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have suspended consular power, but both offices represented the equivalent levels of 
imperium.143 Many scholars have reasoned that Livy (and other ancient historians) based the 
legal abilities of early dictators on Sulla and Caesar, as these later dictators may have indeed 
claimed higher imperium.144 Investigations of the dictator’s imperium are confused, 
contradictory, and based on incomplete evidence. No official classification of a dictator’s 
imperium has survived, if one ever existed at all. Instead of searching Livy’s narrative for 
allusions to an unknowable legal code, it is far more useful to observe the actual ramifications of 
the dictator’s power. 
A speech in Livy from 325 BCE plainly stated, “the power of a dictator is supreme and 
the consuls obey him, although theirs is the authority of kings, as do the praetors.”145 Clearly, 
Livy believed that a dictator outranked a consul.146 Livy also mentioned at least two instances in 
which a current consul was made dictator.147 This would have been entirely redundant if a consul 
and a dictator were essentially equal, and even a hinderance if a dictator held lesser power. In 
203 BCE, Livy recounted a dictator who ordered a consul to return to Italy, “on the strength of 
his superior command.”148 It bears relevance that magistrates rarely “used imperium to check 
imperium,” as challenging someone of comparable rank was dishonorable.149 Nonetheless, when 
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necessary, a dictator could command the consuls. Livy’s account indicated that, if nothing else, a 
dictator functionally outranked a consul.  
Imperium also came with concrete trappings of power, which underscore the dictator’s 
privileged position atop Rome’s power structure. Magistrates with imperium were accompanied 
in public by lictors, who were guards that carried fasces (“bundles of rods with the executioner's 
axe”).150 Along with purple robes, lictors were recycled royal symbols that signified a king’s full 
imperium.151 Kings, and eventually consuls, had twelve lictors.152 Dictators had either twelve or 
twenty-four lictors. The amount may have varied overtime, which reflects that the dictator’s 
imperium perhaps fluctuated.153 The dictator’s lictors were his alone, unlike consuls, who shared 
the guards in turns.154 The fasces were also decidedly symbolic, representing a magistrate’s 
power to kill or use force against a citizen.155 Within the city, a consul’s fasces did not include 
the axe.156 Distinguishing consular and regal imperium, this signified the people’s right to appeal 
the judgement of a consul.157 Significantly, Livy wrote that a dictator’s fasces kept the 
executioner’s axe in the city, which may signify that dictators were not subject to appeal.158 
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156 This was not initially the case, but a very early consul passed a measure that removed the axe within the city, see 
Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 196.  
157 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 226; Brennan, The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, 41. 
158 Livy 2. 18. This was the first dictator, however, so it difficult to speculate about later practices; Bonner, 
“Emergency Government,” 146.  
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Additionally, when a dictator was in office, the consuls’ lictors may have carried “dummy rods,” 
suggesting consular power was inactive and subservient.159 This alternative set of fasces may 
have been visibly different from those of the dictator, although the evidence surrounding dummy 
rods is uncertain.160 Lictors were a tangible representation of imperium, so the use of dummy 
rods for the consuls would seem to suggest the dictator’s supremacy. Therefore, both the 
dictator’s actions and his symbology indicated that the office consistently overpowered the 
consulship.  
Importantly, any actual definition of imperium is temporally-bound, as the nature of 
imperium was not fixed.161 Although this does not allow a precise taxonomy of a dictator’s 
power, it makes sense in the context of the Republic’s perpetual changes. Power was constantly 
redistributed and reorganized as Rome developed.162 In the early Republic, consuls may have 
lost their imperium during a dictator’s term, which is reflected in Livy.163 He wrote that in 339 
BCE, the Senate “wished to terminate the consul’s authority and ordered the appointment of a 
dictator,” which implies that a dictatorship nullified consular imperium.164 During later years, 
especially during the Second Punic War, it has been proposed that consuls may have remained in 
power alongside a dictator.165 Rome had numerous armies fighting on multiple fronts, so this 
would have been a sensible shift. In Livy, there is no mention of this change, although there were 
                                                            
159 Brennan, The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, 42. 
160 Nice, “‘Dummy Rods’?” 22-28. Nice ultimately argued against the existence of dummy rods, but also outlined 
possible archeological depictions of alternative fasces. 
161 Armstrong, War and Society, 166-169; Brennan, “Power and Process,” 35, 40; Brennan, The Praetorship in the 
Roman Republic, 4-14; Keyes, “The Constitutional Position of the Roman Dictatorship,” 299. 
162 Brennan, “Power and Process,” 37-40. Brennan’s entire chapter additionally illustrated this; Lintott, The 
Constitution of the Roman Republic, 38; Eder, “Augustus and the Power of Tradition,” 15. 
163 Livy 22. 11. Approaching a dictator without lictors would seem to indicate this; for dummy rods, see Brennan, 
The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, 42. 
164 Livy 8. 12. 
165 Keyes, “The Constitutional Position of the Roman Dictatorship,” 299, 304. 
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many strange uses of command power during the war.166 Nonetheless, Livy’s account of the 
Second Punic War demonstrated dictators who held the top position.167 Livy wrote that in the 
field, a consul had to “present himself to the dictator without his lictors” in 217 BCE.168 While 
this does reveal any overt change in consular or dictatorial imperium, it may contradict the notion 
that dictators held lesser power by this time.169 Although the dictator’s imperium probably 
evolved overtime, Livy showed that the office still held substantial command power through the 
third century BCE. 
All things considered, any variations in the dictator’s imperium are hardly a revelation. If 
we consider that a dictator’s superiority may have been functional rather than legal, any codified 
difference scarcely reflects any meaningful change. Additionally, dictatorial appointments were 
for a specific task. It is not a leap to assume that the dictator’s imperium varied case to case, 
alongside changing informal expectations on the office. Even if a dictator did not technically 
have more power than a consul, Livy presented dictators who unfailingly acted as the top 
commander. Much of the scholarship tries to force the Republic into dogmatic legalistic terms, 
even though the constitution was highly adaptable. Due to its reactive nature, the dictatorship 
would have been especially subject to reinterpretation (or even experimentation).170 Livy 
illustrated that dictators had considerable imperium and in practice outranked other magistrates. 
                                                            
166 See the particularly unique case in which, “the Senate decreed that all who had held the office of dictator, consul, 
or censor should be invested with full military authority until the enemy withdrew...many such outbreaks occurred 
and were successfully checked,” Livy 26. 10. 
167 Dorey called distinctions between imperium, “a difference not in kind, but degree,” which better reflects the 
functionality of the power than other arguments, Dorey, The Dictatorship of Minucius, 94; Keyes, “The 
Constitutional Position of the Roman Dictatorship,” 299. 
168 Livy 22. 11.  
169 Keyes, “The Constitutional Position of the Roman Dictatorship,” 298-299. Keyes found the dictatorship was 
more powerful during the early Republic, and during the Second Punic War the dictator was closer to a third consul.  
170 For the flexibility of the Roman constitution, see Eder, “Augustus and the Power of Tradition,” 15; Lintott, The 
Constitution of the Roman Republic, 1-6, 15. Lintott’s entire book conveys the constitution’s malleability and 
developments, but these first few pages give a nice introduction.  
30 
 
Beyond these two useful details, any exact classification of a dictator’s power is the result of a 
historiographic attempt to portray an overly legalistic Roman Republic.  
d. Circumstances for Appointment 
Dictators were always appointed to handle a particular emergency or causa.171 Dictators 
are frequently described only as military commanders, but this is an oversimplification. While 
military appointments were the most common, especially in the early Republic, they only 
represent forty-three of Livy’s sixty-seven dictators, or a little less than two-thirds of the total.172 
Efficiency made the office versatile, leading dictators to be appointed for a variety of reasons 
beyond waging war. While there was safety in the consulship’s collegiality, the decisive power 
of an individual was often advantageous.173 Dictators were implemented to calm internal rioting, 
hold elections, or to complete religious duties. The fasti, published lists of Rome’s magistrates, 
noted a dictator’s reason for appointment with a particular label.174 These designations are often 
used as the basis of scholarly discussions.175 This presents a problem, as the fasti do not give the 
full story. Livy’s text narrates details that give a more comprehensive view of each appointment. 
In his account, Rome regularly dealt with multiple concurrent emergencies. The label of a single 
causa often fails to encapsulate the conditions that led to a dictator’s appointment. Livy also 
described a wide variety of dictatorships, showing their importance outside the battlefield. 
                                                            
171 Task-specific appointments were an established concept in Roman politics, see the concept of provincia, 
Drogula, Commands & Command, 169. Drogula gives a discussion of the dictator’s relationship to provincial, which 
has ramifications even after dictators disappeared; Gargola, “Mediterranean Empire,” 155; North, “The Constitution 
of the Roman Republic,” 270.  
172 The fasti lists forty-seven dictators rei gerundae causa, but I have subtracted four dictators seditionis sedandae et 
rei gerundae causa, see Degrassi, Fasti Capitolini, 180-186. Quintus Fabius Maximus could also be arguably added 
to this count, but his role is not straightforward, and he is uniquely labeled as interregni causa, also see Appendix B. 
173 Brennan, The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, 38. 
174 See Appendix B for discussion of fasti; Cohen, “The Origin of the Roman Dictatorship,” 312; Tacitus, Annals, 1. 
1. Tacitus simply stated, “Dictators were assumed in emergencies.” 
175 Which has certain value, but also limitations, see causa-based discussions in de Wilde, “The Dictator’s Trust,”; 
Drogula, Commands & Command, 171-173; Cohen, “The Origin of the Roman Dictatorship.” Cohen did so most 
effectively, exploring religious appointments. 
31 
 
Accordingly, our understanding of the dictatorship should look beyond famous military dictators. 
A more inclusive approach reveals that appointing a dictator was an effective and streamlined 
method for the state to handle a multitude of crises.176 By ignoring the complex circumstances 
that surrounded appointments, the dictatorship’s flexibility and transformations are overlooked. 
The fasti listed the specific causa for each dictator, which produced neat but inadequate 
categories. The most common appointment was rei gerundae causa (which Marc de Wilde called 
“literally, the ‘dictatorship for getting things done’”).177 This was a military dictatorship, usually 
in response to a foreign threat. Generally, these dictators were appointed to lead war efforts after 
a particularly devastating battle, rumors of enemies conspiring, or to complete an especially 
arduous campaign. These dictators are the standard seen in reference works and most prominent 
in Roman memory. Livy wrote about forty-seven dictators rei gerundae causa.178 The fasti 
additionally labeled four of these dictators seditionis sedandae, which meant they were 
specifically intended to handle domestic problems (de Wilde translated this as the “‘dictatorship 
for suppressing civil insurrection’”).179 Internal crises were usually related to class conflict, 
meaning this type of dictator was important during the Struggle of the Orders, (494 to 287 
BCE).180 Some even argue that the dictatorship was created to address domestic disputes.181 
Even if the office was not designed explicitly for rebellion, a dictator’s particular brand of power 
                                                            
176 Golden, Crisis Management, xiv. Golden’s work focused on Rome’s various formal states of emergency, which 
are too complex to unpack in this study, but are certainly relevant to further research.  
177 de Wilde, “The Dictator’s Trust” 559; Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 110. 
178 Degrassi, Fasti Capitolini, 180-186. That is, forty-eight of the dictators that appear in Livy are coded as such in 
the fasti. 
179 Livy 2. 30-31, 7. 38-42, 6. 39-42, 4. 13-16; Degrassi, Fasti Capitolini, 180-186. They specifically appear as 
seditionis sedandae et rei gerundae causa; de Wilde, “The Dictator’s Trust,” 559. 
180 Golden (Crisis Management, 22-23) emphasized the dictatorship’s crisis role during class conflict.  
181 As discussed, the precise imperium of a dictator is contentious, but a dictator may have had considerably more 
power within the city walls than a consul, leading to this assumption, see Chapter III-c “Power and Imperium”; 
Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 18, 32, 111; Drogula, Commanders & Command, 119, 169-170. 
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may have been suited to civil insurrections.182 The dictator was not subject to appeal, and may 
have had the power to use force against citizens,183 which made him more useful than a consul 
for domestic unrest.184  Even so, these labels fail to express the complexity of appointments. Livy 
allows us to look at the actual situations in which a dictator was appointed, rather than just the 
assigned causa. 
Although only four of Livy’s dictators were formally appointed to handle insurrection 
(seditionis sedandae), I find at least ten instances when class warfare was a key factor, all 
notably falling before 330 BCE.185 By this time, plebeians had attained admission to offices and 
various legal reform.186 Also of note are the four successive dictators who were appointed (at 
least in part) because of class conflicts during the pivotal years of 385-368 BCE.187 The 
impactful Licinio-Sextian laws (lex Licinia Sextia ) were passed from 367-366 BCE. This set of 
reforms gave plebeians access to one of the consular positions, capped public land holdings 
(which was largely a restriction on the elite), and provided plebeian debt relief.188 Naturally, the 
aristocracy attempted to maintain control through dictators.189 In some cases, a dictator’s official 
task appeared to act as a pretext. Livy described a scenario in 494 BCE, in which a dictator was 
technically meant to lead war, but “the commons were well aware that the appointment of a 
                                                            
182 Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 18; Drogula, Commanders & Command, 119, 123, 338. 
183 See Chapter III-c “Power and Imperium.” 
184 Drogula (Commanders & Command, 119, 123, 338) suggested that the appointment of a dictator may “have been 
the equivalent of a declaration of martial law in early Rome,” which is perhaps overstated, but nonetheless 
underlined the dictator’s special privileges within the city. 
185 Livy 2. 18, 2. 30-31, 4. 13-16, 4. 31-34, 6. 11-16, 6. 28-29, 6. 38, 6. 39-42, 7. 12-13, 8. 18. This count is very 
much subject to interpretation, other examinations could certainly include find an alternative number. 
186 Oakley, “The Early Republic,” 17-18. 
187 See Appendix A. 
188 The laws were passed in 367 and 366 BCE, see Oakley, “The Early Republic,” 18; The exact impact and purpose 
of these laws are naturally up for debate, see Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 338-341. 




dictator was directed against themselves.”190 Again in 385 BCE, a dictator was appointed for 
“serious foreign war and an even more serious internal resurrection.”191 Officially, this dictator 
was portrayed as a military response. Yet, Livy wrote that the appointment, “was not aimed at 
the Volscians, who were enemies only when it suited the patricians.”192 Both of these dictators 
are recorded exclusively as rei gerundae causa in the fasti.193  
Livy also provided many illustrations of the complicated circumstances that surrounded 
appointments. In a representative example, Livy’s first dictator appears in the fasti as rei 
gerundae causa. Despite being categorized as a military assignment, Titus Lartius was appointed 
in 501 BCE in response to a combination of threats.194 In Livy’s version of the story, “mounting 
anxiety and tension” were overwhelming Rome.195 Conflict with the neighboring Sabines196 
looked imminent, and there was a threat of a league of Latin settlements banding together against 
Rome.197 Internally, there was a skirmish between young Sabine men during the Games,198 
which escalated and drew a crowd.199 There were also rumors of Roman officials discussing 
“sympathies” for the Tarquins.200 In this increasingly tense climate, Titus Lartius was appointed 
dictator.201 He proved to be effective at handling both varieties of conflict.  
                                                            
190 Livy 2. 30-31. 
191 Livy 6. 11. 
192 Livy 6. 15. 
193 Degrassi, Fasti Capitolini, 180-186. 
194 Livy 2. 18; Niebuhr (The History of Rome, Volume 1, 335) interestingly suggested that Titus Lartius was already 
consul; it is also worth noting that scholars are unsure if imperium varied between appointment types, and this 
perhaps changed overtime, see Drogula, Commanders & Command, 169, Keyes, “The Constitutional Position of the 
Roman Dictatorship,” 304-305; Livy (23. 23) wrote about an odd case in which a dictator objected to “granting the 
full power of the dictatorship…for any purpose other than that of directing operations in the field.” 
195 Livy 2. 18. 
196 An Italian tribe who lived north of Rome, which led to frequent war between the two groups.   
197 Livy 2. 18. 
198 The Roman Games were a large public event, highly religious, and generally meant to celebrate a military 
victory, see Rüpke, “Communicating with the Gods,” 220, 225. 
199 Livy 2. 18. 
200 Livy 2. 18. The Tarquins were the last of Rome’s monarchs. Traditionally, this was less than a decade after Rome 
expelled its kings, making this a serious threat.  
201 Livy 2. 18. 
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According to Livy, citizens had “a more docile frame of mind” simply from seeing the 
dictator in the city.202 The Sabines were so alarmed by the appointment of a dictator that they 
immediately made efforts to avoid war.203 This dictator did not even have to enter the battlefield 
to resolve a variety of issues. As Livy presented it, the mere act of appointing a dictator was 
enough to comfort Romans and frighten enemies.204 Despite his military assignment, the dictator 
had considerable influence over domestic affairs. Strict labeling muddles the actual purpose of 
the dictatorship, which was to provide an efficient response to an emergency situation. Dictators 
were appointed when Rome was reaching a crisis point, often due to multiple internal and 
external concerns. Furthermore, dictators rei gerundae clearly handled many different tasks, both 
military and civil. 
The remaining categories of dictator are less often discussed. Nonetheless, these dictators 
add to our understanding of the institution. Apart from acting as a military commander or 
suppressing unrest, the dictator also managed religious emergencies. Even a dictator rei 
gerundae causa was expected to complete religious responsibilities, which further underlines the 
challenge of categorizing dictators. Three appointments appear to be specifically for religious 
crises, although religious fears and ritual were a part of all dictatorships (and all Roman 
government).205 One of these dictators was appointed to hold a public holiday (feriarum 
constituendarum causa), while the other two carried out a highly debated practice.206 These two 
men were appointed to complete an obscure religious ceremony, in which a dictator (clavi 
                                                            
202 Livy 2. 18. 
203 Livy 2. 18. 
204 Cohen, “The Origin of the Roman Dictatorship,” 308. 
205 Livy 7. 3, 7. 28, 8. 18, and perhaps a fourth, Livy (8. 38) begrudgingly offers an alternate explanation for the 
dictator, to run chariot races. 




figendi causa)207 nailed a hammer into a board to prevent plague.208 Even Livy’s initial 
description of this ritual is peculiar.  
In 363 BCE, Rome was being ravaged by plague, and it seemed the gods were ignoring 
pleas for mercy.209 Apparently, older members of the community recalled, “at one time an 
outbreak of plague had been reduced by the dictator’s hammering in a nail.”210 The Senate took 
to this idea, and Lucius Manlius Imperious was named to complete the ritual.211 In a bizarre turn 
of events, Manlius failed to actually hammer the nail. He decided to ignore the reason for his 
appointment. Instead, Manlius “set his heart on war with the Hernici,” but the Senate forced him 
to resign before he accomplished anything.212 Manlius’s dictatorship raises questions about the 
types of dictators. While it appears from his attempt that a dictator that was appointed for a 
different task still had the imperium to conduct war, the backlash to his actions imply some sort 
of restrictions on his power. 
Despite Manlius’s botched attempt, a dictator was appointed for the hammering ritual 
once again in 332 BCE. Livy wrote that the Romans remembered Manlius’s ceremony, which 
inexplicably had helped restore “self-control” during a class conflict.213 Despite Livy’s 
contradictory information, this later dictator completed the ceremony.214 Livy also mentioned a 
dictator carrying out this ritual in 313 BCE.215 The dictators who completed this unusual 
                                                            
207 Degrassi, Fasti Captiolini; Kaplan, "Religious Dictators,” 173. 
208 Livy may have misinterpreted this event, which may have been to mark years, see Cornell, The Beginnings of 
Rome, 220; Cohen, “The Origin of the Roman Dictatorship,” 305-306; Livy mentioned dictators appointed for this 
purpose, see Livy 7. 3, 8. 18. 
209 Livy 7. 3. 
210 Livy 7. 3. 
211 Livy 7. 3. 
212 Livy 7. 3; See also Chapter III-h “Leaving Office” for more on this and other forced resignations.   
213 Livy 7. 18. 
214 Livy 7. 18. 
215 Livy 9. 28. Though, Livy expressed doubts about this incident.  
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ceremony bear little resemblance to well-known military dictators, which demonstrates the need 
to expand discussions of the dictatorship. Moreover, the dictator commonly had religious 
obligations—often tangential to his military or other tasks—like holding Games, dedicating 
temples, or overseeing additional rituals.216 Although dictators were seldom appointed explicitly 
for these rituals, completing religious duties was an important aspect of the position.217  
Lastly, dictators were also appointed to conduct elections (comitiorum habendorum 
causa).218 These appointments are often ignored in discussions, likely because they were 
relatively mundane. Yet, electoral dictators prove the office’s versatility. While not a 
catastrophic emergency, dictators held elections when a consul was unavailable. Dictators were a 
useful solution when consuls were ill, incapacitated, or else unable to return to Rome while 
leading combat.219 This administrative role became more and more common overtime. Many 
earlier dictators were war heroes, but their third century BCE counterparts were frequently 
trusted civil servants.220 Livy wrote about seventeen dictators appointed for elections.221 This 
mode of dictatorship may have been comparatively dull, but the office was still filling a vital 
role. As Rome expanded, consuls were involved with wars that were much farther away, 
meaning it was increasingly problematic to recall them for elections.222 
                                                            
216 Games: Livy 6. 42, 7. 11, 8. 40, 22. 9, 27. 35; dedications: Livy 5. 20; 6. 29; 10.1, 22. 9; rituals: Livy 6. 12, 22. 9. 
There are more examples for each, but these show a variety throughout.  
217 Especially as dictators were often appointed amidst religious anxieties. Notably, Camillus’s dictatorships often 
had an ethos of restoring piety, see especially, Livy 5. 19-23. 
218 Drogula, Commanders & Command, 169. 
219 Ill consuls: Livy 7. 24-7. 25; consuls in the field: Livy 7. 26, 8. 16, 8. 23 (although this dictator resigned before 
elections); new offices like the praetorship also helped to fill extra command positions, see Brennan, “Power and 
Process,” 38-40.   
220 Drogula, Commanders & Command, 178. 
221 I am also including Marcus Fabius Buteo in this count, although he was not comitiorum habendorum causa, but 
senatus legendi causa, as he was uniquely appointed to elect senators during the Second Punic War, see Livy 23. 22-
23. 
222 Livy 22. 8. See the example of Quintus Fabius in Chapter III-g “Magister Equitum” 
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Before the Second Punic War, Livy reported only eight of fifty-six dictators appointed for 
elections (one-seventh). During the war, this ratio changed dramatically. From 217 to 201 BCE, 
Livy listed only eleven dictators total. Again, eight of these dictators were meant to hold 
elections, but they represented nearly three-quarters of appointments during the Second Punic  
War (Table 1). 223 The timeline makes sense, as Rome and its consuls were engaged in larger 
conflicts during this time.224 Appointing an electoral dictator allowed normal election cycles to 
continue even during longer campaigns. Rome no longer needed dictators to conduct war, but 
instead implemented the office to keep government running smoothly. The dictator had become 
more useful as a reserve administrator than a temporary general. These dictators were not 
directly leading war but were nonetheless essential to Rome’s success. 
Military dictators were admittedly the most common, and surely the most famous. Even 
so, the variety of dictators reflected the Republic’s flexibility. The Romans continually adapted 
the dictatorship to suit a shifting assortment of emergencies, responsive to the Republic’s 
constantly changing needs. As Livy’s history indicated, the circumstances surrounding a 
dictator’s appointment were rarely straightforward. By definition, dictators were appointed amid 
emergencies, which are inherently disordered. In order to truly understand the dictator’s role, it is 
necessary not only to look at the full scope of dictators, but also how power was enacted outside 
their specific task. In short, the Roman dictatorship was a flexible office that filled an assortment 
of formal and informal roles, which led to (or least allowed for) the institution’s continual 
evolution throughout the Republic’s development.  
                                                            
223 See also Appendix A. 





e. The Appointment Process 
Despite the urgency of many dictatorships, the process of appointment was formalized 
and rarely deviated from convention. The general procedure appears fairly consistent throughout 
Livy. Only a consul could nominate a dictator.226 Livy wrote that appointments by consul were, 
“a solemn tradition, backed by religious sanctions.”227 The Senate could not officially challenge a 
consul’s choice of dictator. Yet even without legal authority, the Senate appeared to be involved 
in virtually all dictatorial appointments. The Senate frequently went to great lengths to compel an 
appointment, but the decision ultimately rested with a consul. In later dictatorships, there were a 
few notable exceptions. As with many aspects of the dictatorship, a closer investigation of the 
appointment process can demonstrate gaps in scholarly discourse. Although Livy reaffirmed—on 
multiple occasions—that only a consul could appoint a dictator, his narrative often showed the 
                                                            
225 See Appendix A for specific names, causa, and citations for Livy. 
226 Brennan, The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, 38; de Wilde, “The Dictator’s Trust,” 558; Harris, Roman 
Power, 75. Consular appointments are almost universally accepted, but these are a few examples. 
227 Livy 4. 31. 
Table 1: Livy's Dictators by Type225 
501-301 BCE 
217-201 BCE 
(Second Punic War) 
Total Dictators: 56 11 
Elections: 
(comitiorum habendorum causa, 
senatus legendi causa) 
8 (14 %) 8 (73 %) 
Military: 
(Rei gerundae causa) 
41 (73 %) 2 (18 %) 
Other: 
(clavi figendi causa, feriarum 
constituendarum causa, seditionis 
sedandae et rei gerundae causa, 
interregni causa) 
7 (13 %) 1 (9 %) 
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Senate’s extensive influence.228 Particularly in older scholarship, the dynamics of informal 
powers are largely disregarded, as they operated outside the known legal code.229 The process of 
appointing dictators clearly demonstrated the key political roles of tradition, expectation, and 
power relationships, which were not adequately expressed in any official law.230 As Lintott aptly 
described, Rome’s “flexible conceptualization of the constitution” allowed the Republic to adapt 
by continually shifting the balance of power “between Senate, People, and magistrates.”231 
Livy’s text revealed informal pressures and peculiarities in appointment practices, which can 
exhibit these continual negotiations of control. 
In 353 BCE, Livy wrote that the Senate “ordered” the consul Marcus Valerius Publicola 
out of the field to appoint a dictator. Valerius was in Tusculum, just over fifteen miles (a day’s 
journey) from Rome.232 Throughout Livy’s account, this was normal practice. When the Senate 
wanted a dictator, consuls were obliged to return to Rome. Dictators also had to be appointed 
within Italy, which became progressively more inconvenient.233 As Rome became engaged in 
more warfare, farther from the city, it was often difficult to contact consuls.234 Yet, the Senate 
still summoned consuls from the field to appoint dictators. The process was honored even when 
inconvenient, showing adherence to tradition.235 Even still, Livy plainly showed the Senate 
pulling the strings. The initial decision to name a dictator usually originated in the Senate. 
Phrases appear in Livy like, “the Senate lost no time in ordering the appointment of a dictator,” 
                                                            
228 Livy 4. 26, 22. 8. Livy confirmed consular appointments in these instances. 
229 Mommsen and contemporaries are often criticized for this, see Mouritsen, Politics in the Roman Republic, 7.  
230 Flower, “Introduction,” 2; Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 4. 
231 Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 15. 
232 Livy 7. 19. 
233 Livy 27. 5. 
234 Livy 22. 8. A prominent example, which is discussed in Chapter III-g “Magister Equitum.” 
235 Barring the notable exception of Quintus Fabius Maximus, who is discussed below.  
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or “the Senate decided to appoint a dictator,” which reaffirm senatorial influence.236 In 310 BCE, 
the Senate selected a dictator with whom a consul had a “personal grudge.”237 The Senate 
arranged an envoy to convince the consul. He succumbed but was not pleased. The consul “kept 
his eyes on the ground and retired without a word,” and continued to be insolently silent the next 
day in order to display his “strong resentment.”238 In practice, a consular appointment often 
seemed to be a formality.  
Livy also wrote about instances in which a consul was actively against the nomination of 
a dictator, but was ostensibly forced by the Senate. In 431 BCE, multiple enemies were preparing 
for war, an aggressive epidemic was worsening, and tensions were high between the year’s 
consuls. The tumultuous state of affairs alarmed the Senate and they accordingly called for a 
dictator.239 Inopportunely, the argumentative consuls could only agree on one idea, “their 
opposition to the Senate over the appointment of a Dictator.”240 Despite the rare allegiance of the 
adversarial consuls, their decision was challenged. A group of consular tribunes saw this as “an 
opportunity of increasing their power,” and decreed a “unanimous resolution,” which threatened 
to imprison the consuls if they defied the Senate’s will.241 The consuls decided it was “less 
unpleasant” to succumb to the tribunes, and they disgruntledly appointed a dictator.242 In this 
case, there was an interesting negotiation of political power. Consular tribunes certainly had an 
amount of influence over the consuls, but it appears that it took the intimidation of both the 
Senate and the tribunes to force the appointment. Also notable is that the consuls preferred to 
                                                            
236 Livy 4. 57, 7. 28. 
237 Livy 9. 38. 
238 Livy 9. 38. 
239 Livy 4. 26. 
240 Livy 4. 26. 
241 Livy 4. 26. Tribunes with consular powers. 
242 Livy 4. 26. 
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obey the tribunes over the Senate, which underlines the interesting role of informal precedents 
and power dynamics.  
The Senate did not only demand appointments, but they were also concerned with a 
consul’s choice of dictator. The first plebeian dictator, Gaius Marcius Rutulus, was nominated in 
357 BCE in response to a military threat.243 While the circumstances of appointment were 
familiar, the choice of a plebeian was unprecedented. Livy remarked that the elite “thought it 
outrageous that even the dictatorship should now be open to all” and tried to block “any decision 
or preparation.” The exact opposing patrician group is unclear, although Livy seemed to refer to 
the Senate. He wrote that “the people” rallied behind the dictator, “all the readier to vote for 
everything the dictator proposed.”244 Gaius was very successful in battle, and “was granted a 
triumph by the people…without Senate authorization.”245 In this case, it is evident that the 
Senate could not legally override a consul’s choice of dictator. They could, however, resist 
appointments and make action difficult. Visibly, the Senate had substantial influence, even 
outside of their lawful authority.246 Also important was the people’s embrace of Gaius Marcius. 
The dictator still received enough support to be effective. He was even able to win an unofficial 
triumph, showing an assertion of the people’s power. In just this one instance, Livy displayed the 
fluctuating relationship between the Senate, people, and the consuls. Clearly, appointments could 
involve an elaborate negotiation process outside the letter of the law. 
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246 Mouritsen, Politics in the Roman Republic, 143. 
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I find only three cases in Livy of dictators who were appointed without a consul.247 All 
were especially unusual circumstances. In 426 BCE, consular tribunes chose a dictator. This was 
during the notoriously confusing period in which consular tribunes allegedly held office instead 
of consuls.248 The appointment was sanctioned by both the people and augurs.249 A consul did 
not appoint this dictator, but the consular power did.250 There was a more notable exception to 
tradition in 217 BCE, during the thick of the Second Punic War. Both consuls were heavily 
engaged in hard battles, so deep in enemy territory that the Senate was not even able to send a 
letter.251 Although Livy reiterated that a consul had the sole power to appoint a dictator, in an 
“unprecedented step” the people (with the strong consent of the Senate) appointed Quintus 
Fabius Maximus as “acting-dictator.”252 
In this strange incident, Livy suggested that a consul’s appointment was used in all prior 
dictatorships.253 Notably, this dictator was still branded as “acting,” because he lacked the proper 
consular authorization. Fabius also dealt with unparalleled insurrection from his master of horse, 
which perhaps emphasized the importance of the sacred process.254 Without proper adherence to 
tradition, Fabius was only “acting” and received considerably less respect.255 In this context, 
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Fabius’s appointment was representative of the Republic’s larger developments. The people’s 
will had more impact, enough that they were able to essentially mimic a consul’s power. The 
Senate’s influence had also grown, allowing them to respond to the Second Punic War’s near-
constant influx of disasters.256 The next year, amid utter chaos and heavy casualties, Livy 
reported that a dictator was appointed “on the Senate’s authority” to hold widespread 
conscription.257 These discrepancies in the dictator’s protected selection process clearly 
paralleled larger developments in the Republic’s power structure.  
While dictators were legally appointed by consul, Livy illustrated that this legality must 
be understood in the context of the Senate’s extraordinary impact, the growing voice of citizens, 
and an array of other informal influences. The Republic was in an endless process of reshaping 
and amending its unwritten constitution. Tradition was important, but so was practicality and 
responsiveness. The case of the “acting-dictator” expressed this philosophy towards breaking 
custom.258 If Rome had strictly adhered to its legal code, the state may have suffered a damaging 
military defeat. Instead, the Romans chose to adapt. By granting the dictator provisional status, 
they were able to respect tradition while still taking practical action. Although the appointment 
may have been theoretically illegal, there was an informal precedent for the Senate’s 
appointment of dictators. The decision also reflected the political shifts which were progressively 
empowering both the Senate and the populace. As a result, Livy demonstrated the value of 
looking beyond official law code when examining both the dictatorship and the Republic.  
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f. Ceremony and the Auspices 
Once appointed, a dictator acquired auspicium through an obscure ceremony.259 In 
essence, auspicium was the ability to commune with the gods and interpret their signals.260 
Dictators held auspicia maxima, the highest level of religious authority.261 It was vital for 
magistrates to possess auspicium, as consulting the auspices was a key government function. For 
dictators (as well as other magistrates), errors or faults in the auspices occurred often, meaning 
the dictator was required to return to Rome and repeat the ceremony, or else resign. Scholars 
often write that the dictator’s deep ties to auspicium lent the office its “sacral” qualities that may 
have helped preserve it overtime.262 A guise of piety, however, was also an effective way to 
challenge a dictator. The interpretation of the auspices was highly sensitive, which made it easy 
to exploit. As a result, the dictator’s auspices were a way to circumvent his untouchable status. 
Even if he did not resign, a dictator’s progress could be stalled by a return to Rome. In the early 
Republic, patricians alone were able to possess auspicium, a major cause of class conflict.263 
Roman religion was controlled by the elite, even as political offices and other public functions 
became more inclusive.264 The aristocracy carefully protected the auspices, which helped to stifle 
plebeian access to the most powerful offices. Livy described many incidents involving improper 
auspices, which allows us to observe aristocratic attempts to retain control of the dictatorship. 
Auspication was the practice of watching birds, examining entrails, observing natural 
signs, or consulting other divine prophecies before a decision or event.265 While auspices were 
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consulted as part of the political process, their true purpose was not prediction, but to calm 
religious fears with ancient tradition.266 Interpreting proper auspices, or favorable omens, was 
essential for actions like the confirmation of magistrates and beginning battles.267 Although Livy 
mentioned the dictator’s auspices often, he gave little detail about the appointment ceremony. 
The ritual was sacred, secretive, and exceedingly sensitive. According to Livy, the ceremony 
involved a consul, who appointed the dictator, “in the silence of night, as custom is.”268 Then, the 
consul would listen, in silence, for a sound of disapproval from the gods. Quiet was taken as 
divine approval for the dictator to take the auspices.269 This appears to be the standard process, as 
in another case, Livy wrote that a “consul had risen in the night and made the appointment in 
silence.”270 The dictatorship’s enigmatic ceremony was uniquely strange, as other appointments 
were not handled this way.271 Livy’s descriptions were sporadic and vague, but this secrecy 
protected the ceremony and auspicium. The details of the odd ritual are obscure to us, but this 
may be because it was also mysterious to most Romans, even within politics. 
The ceremony’s elusiveness and fragility were likely deliberate. The sensitivity of the 
ritual was perhaps the only formal method to undermine a dictator’s power. Livy wrote about 
nearly constant issues with the auspices, including six cases that led to a dictator’s resignation.272 
Superficially, detecting a fault in the auspices was an act of piety. The ceremony was redone for 
various ambiguous reasons, such as a “sinister omen,” or “religious doubts.” 273 More 
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realistically, most accusations of improper auspices were politically motivated.274 Any mistakes 
in the auspices were taken very seriously, and thus challenging a dictator’s auspicium was an 
effective tactic. In 302 BCE, the dictator Marcus Valerius Maximus returned to the city to retake 
the auspices, which left his magister equitum to be “ambushed” and lose several men.275 A 
similar situation occurred during the Second Punic War, when dictators were operating much 
farther from Rome.276 Plainly, an accusation against the dictator’s auspices required a return to 
Rome, even when it exposed his army to considerable risk.  
Secretive practices made the auspices esoteric, and thus the ritual could be exploited by 
the aristocracy. Even as plebeians gained access to power, the patricians were still able to 
manipulate the dictator’s appointment process. As the highest offices were expected to have 
auspicium, this allowed the elite to exert control over the top religious roles and political 
positions.277 Livy included multiple examples of the aristocracy’s attempts to guard the auspices. 
After a plebeian consul was killed in a disastrous battle, patricians cried that it was divine 
punishment for giving the “auspices to those for whom it was a sin to take them!”278 A patrician 
from the old-elite Claudius family was made dictator to remedy this religious problem, 
underlining the aristocratic protection of the auspices. As dictators held the maximum level of 
auspicium,279 the elite’s religious supremacy also helps to explain why the office was dominated 
by aristocratic men.  
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Even when the top offices opened to plebeians, the auspices were used to repress 
plebeian progress. In 327 BCE, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, a plebeian, was appointed dictator 
for the purpose of holding elections.280 Soon after, an inquiry was held into his auspicium and 
appointment, which were deemed “irregular.”281 Livy did not reveal the specific source of the 
concerns. It can, however, be assumed the question originated in the Senate or established 
aristocracy, as plebeian tribunes fought the accusation. They argued that a “flaw could not have 
been easily detected,” due to the secrecy of the ceremony, meaning it was truly an excuse to oust 
a plebeian dictator.282 These allegations were not unrealistic, as Marcellus was only the third 
plebeian to take the position. The accusations were upheld, and the dictator resigned. As a result, 
elections were not held. Rather than repeating the auspices or appointing a new dictator, Rome 
went into an interregnum.283 An interregnum was a pause in the normal functioning of 
government. It was instated when no magistrates were in office, due to the expiration of their 
term, or a resignation.  
In Livy, only seven dictators were compelled to resign before completing their term or 
task.284 Six out of these seven dictators were pushed out due to religious concerns or flaws in 
their elections.285 Conspicuously, four of these dictatorships resulted in an interregnum.286 
During an interregnum, a string of single patrician senators would serve as interrex for five days, 
passing imperium and auspicium until normal functioning was restored.287 Reverting to an 
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interregnum was a way for the aristocrats to temporarily take control of Rome, although an 
interrex was not as powerful as a dictator or consul.288 While interregnums were purportedly to 
maintain government between elections, Livy’s narrative showed them to be much closer to 
aristocratic power grabs. Naturally, interregnums were common during the height of the Struggle 
of the Orders. Between 338 and 321 BCE, there were three cases in which Rome fell to an 
interregnum after the resignation of a dictator.289 In 321 BCE, two dictators in a row were ousted 
due to issues with the auspices.290 This surely represented the aristocracy attempting to maintain 
control of Rome, especially as the period between 356 and 300 BCE saw the opening of virtually 
all offices to plebeians.291  
So, the obscure details of the dictator’s appointment process are less important than the 
ritual’s role in Republican politics. The ceremony was a relic of old aristocracy and ancient 
religion, and therefore mysterious. While the dictatorship was flexible, the procedure was not. 
Religion was deeply tied to the dictatorship, as Livy underlined with statements such as, “the 
order of a dictator, which has always been revered as the gods’ will.”292 Consequently, 
auspicium was essential to the dictatorship’s power, making adherence to the process crucial. As 
plebeians encroached on elite supremacy, the fragility and necessity of the ceremony was 
weaponized. By regulating knowledge and control of religion, the aristocracy was able to exploit 
ritual in order to maintain control of the dictatorship. 
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g. Magister Equitum  
After being appointed, the dictator chose a master of horse, or magister equitum, to serve 
as his second-in-command.293 Information about the dictatorship is inconsistent, and details 
about his magister equitum are even scarcer. It is largely accepted that the position stemmed 
from an ancient rule that forbid a dictator to ride on horseback.294 So, masters of horse were 
customarily in charge of the cavalry, while the dictator lead the infantry.295 Livy stated that a 
master of horse’s “power is equivalent to a consul’s.”296 This may have been true at some point, 
but the powers of the magister equitum may have changed alongside the dictatorship.297 Perhaps 
more notably, the dynamic between dictator and master of horse changed from the early 
Republic. Almost universally, early masters of horse seem to have acted as obedient second 
commanders. Some pairs exhibited extraordinary loyalty, like Cincinnatus’s master of horse, 
who killed an accused conspirator because he declined to appear in front of the dictator.298 
Cincinnatus then fervently defended his magister equitum from angered citizens.299 Later in the 
Republic, masters of horse were less subservient. While it is easy to observe variations in the 
frequency of dictatorships or their causa, the subtleties of this relationship can only be seen in a 
narrative text like Livy. He often recounted interactions between the dictator and the master of 
horse, especially in the field. The shifting dynamic between the two commanders may be 
representative of the dictator’s changed role during the Second Punic War. The dictator’s official 
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imperium may have been consistent, but diminished respect from his second-in-command can 
nonetheless reveal the dictator’s altered role within the Republic.  
The harmony between early dictators and masters of horse may simply be attributed to 
choice. Before 358 BCE, Livy said (or implied) that a dictator chose his master of horse.300 The 
dictator generally selected an obvious ally, or even a son.301 Beginning in 358 BCE, many 
masters of horse were “given” to a dictator, usually by the Senate.302 Unfortunately, Livy gave 
no explanation for this change. The shift may mark a modification of the dictator’s power, the 
Senate’s influence, or else a redefinition of the master of horse. Ten years prior, Publius Manlius 
was the first dictator to choose a plebeian as his magister equitum. This openly “annoyed the 
patricians” but Publius claimed a “close relationship” with his appointee.303 The dictator’s choice 
escalated to a full-blown class conflict, which resulted in heated debates that completely 
overshadowed any of Publius’s actions while in power.304 Only two years later, in 356 BCE, the 
first plebeian dictator took office. The timeline is damning, as during the class conflicts in 352 to 
345 BCE there were six dictators, four of whom Livy explicitly stated were “given” their master 
of horse.305 About a decade after the start of the Licinio-Sextian laws,306 this was a pivotal time 
for the Struggle of the Orders. For the first time, it seemed all offices were opening to plebeians. 
So, it is imaginable that the transition to a “given” master of horse was an attempt to protect the 
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elite hold on the entire institution of the dictatorship. The theory is not watertight, as many of 
these dictators were still (to some extent) aligned with the aristocracy. Nonetheless, the change 
displayed that the dictator’s role was fluctuating.  
In addition, the master of horse’s role may have evolved. A magister equitum never won 
a triumph, which may indicate they could not possess imperium or auspicium.307 Some sources 
seem to indicate that a magister equitum was attended by six lictors, half of a dictator’s, but a 
magister equitum is not reported with lictors until the late Republic.308 The late appearance of 
lictors aligns with the theory that masters of horse were granted imperium at some point. It is 
also noteworthy that command power was expanded to more men during the difficult years of 
the Second Punic War.309 By this time, masters of horse may have possessed imperium minus, a 
lesser degree of power.310 It makes sense that in the era of increased warfare, having an extra 
commander with imperium would have been prudent. Perhaps this also helps to explain why 
masters of horse were assigned to dictators.311 If masters of horse came to possess imperium (or 
were even equal to a consul, as Livy suggested) this meant the magister equitum would have 
been a more protected office. Perhaps allowing a dictator to choose an assistant with imperium 
was too risky, or else assigning a magister equitum was a new check to a dictator’s power. 
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As time went on, not all masters of horse were content to act as lieutenant. If masters of 
horse were indeed given imperium, the evolution is reasonable. A more powerful master of horse 
would have been less likely to yield to a dictator. Regardless of the cause, Livy exhibited a 
demonstrable change in the master of horse’s behavior. In 325 BCE, Rome was engaged in war 
against the Samnites. The consul overseeing the conflict fell ill, which led to the appointment of 
the dictator Lucius Papirius Cursor.312 Papirius picked his own magister equitum, Quintus Fabius 
Maximus Rullianus. As the men were nearing Samnium, a flaw in the auspices was found by 
“the keeper of the sacred chickens.”313 As was customary, this was taken very seriously. Papirius 
quickly returned to Rome to properly retake the auspices. The dictator forbade the army and 
Quintus Fabius to take any action until he returned.314 While Papirius was in Rome, scouts 
reported that the Samnites were unprepared for attack.315 The young master of horse decided to 
defy the dictator’s orders and seized the opportunity to strike. Livy described Quintus Fabius as 
either hungry for glory or “fired with indignation that all initiative should apparently be in the 
hands of the dictator.”316 Despite his disobedience, Fabius’s ambush led to a successful battle, 
which—according to Livy—cost the Samnites some twenty-thousand casualties.317  
Successes aside, the master of horse had defied Rome’s supreme commander. Papirius 
further tried to safeguard his win by sending word of the success directly to the Senate (and not 
his commander). Papirius was furious with the insurrection. He even called for Quintus Fabius’s 
execution, which seems to have been within the dictator’s rights.318 Papirius declared that the 
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defiance had undermined the sacred power of the dictator.319 He felt the precedent would be 
harmful to the institution. The two men engaged in a ferociously jealous fight for credit. Quintus 
Fabius seemed to be afraid of the dictator’s wrath. He assembled soldiers to support his assertion 
that he “had conducted himself as master of Horse and not as the dictator’s orderly!”320 
Nonetheless, the incident was used as an opportunity to reinforce the dictator’s power. Papirius 
gave a speech emphasizing that he left for religious reasons, meaning Quintus Fabius had 
violated both “our fathers’ teaching and the gods’ divine power.”321 Papirius inflated the entire 
incident, declaring that in blocking his punishment of Quintus Fabius, the tribunes would 
“destroy the lawful effectiveness of the dictatorship.”322 The conflict ended unspectacularly, as 
Papirius granted mercy because the people begged for it.323  
In the end, Papirius may have been correct about the incident’s adverse precedent. During 
the Second Punic War, a defiant magister equitum managed to be promoted to co-dictator for a 
short time.324 The “acting-dictator” Quintus Fabius Maximus was strategically delaying the 
army’s approach to Hannibal’s men. Master of horse Minucius grew tired of Fabius’s stalling 
and tried to turn the troops against him. The master of horse invoked “Camillus, that true 
Roman,” as an example of decisive action.325 Inopportunely, Fabius was summoned back to the 
city “to attend to certain religious matters” and urged Minucius to proceed cautiously and to 
continue the tactical delays.326 The magister equitum did not listen and led a battle in the 
dictator’s absence with “some success.” Minucius sent “a letter full of braggadocio” back to 
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Rome after the modest victory.327 Then, the government also began to turn on Fabius. A plebeian 
tribune declared that Fabius had delayed in the field in order to extend his dictatorship.328 
Enraged, the tribune asked “that power be shared equally between the dictator and the master of 
Horse.”329 Despite Fabius’s protests that Minucius had acted recklessly, the decree was 
accepted.330 The contention became even more apparent as the two co-dictators worked together 
in the field. Minucius was thrilled by the “equalization,” feeling encouraged that he had broken 
the pattern “where mere masters of Horse had been in the habit of cringing like curs before the 
dictator’s terrible rods and axes.”331   
Increased power for the master of horse or decreased reverence for the dictatorship may 
have instigated the newfound defiance. Granted, cases of insubordination come from Livy’s later 
work, which contains generally more accurate information (or else it was harder for Livy to 
fabricate stories).332 The early Republic was highly romanticized in the record, meaning 
insubordinate masters of horse may have been glossed over. Nonetheless, increasingly insolent 
masters of horse may have reflected shifts in power. Precedents like Quintus Fabius showed that 
as the Republic progressed, dictators were not as untouchable as they once were. The office’s 
adaptability made it useful, but perhaps not all changes strengthened the position. The 
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aristocracy and top magistrates were increasingly subject to both the will of the Senate and the 
people. Despite the dictatorship’s privileged status, the institution was not immune to the 
growing impact of popular sovereignty.  
h. Leaving Office 
After completing his service, a dictator was meant to step down immediately and relinquish 
his power. Scholars almost unanimously agree that a dictatorship was limited to six months.333 
This was the typical length of a campaigning season, at least in the early Republic.334 In general, 
six months was not a term length as much as a maximum limit. Once he had accomplished his 
task, an honorable dictator would resign. Almost every dictator obeyed the six-month term, if 
they did not step down even sooner.335 Livy confirmed a six-month term,336 although he wrote 
that many glorified early dictators resigned after only days or weeks. Debates surrounding the 
term limit usually discuss whether a dictator’s term was tied to the consul who appointed him, or 
else the possibility of sporadic year-long terms.337 In the end, these inquiries were not only 
inconclusive, but are also largely inconsequential. The term limit itself was not as revealing as 
the intricacies of resignations. Harris argued that term limits were a way for Rome to continue its 
delusion of democracy.338 In turn, perhaps resigning was a means for the ruling classes to create 
the allusion of yielding to the people or the Senate. Relinquishing your office exhibited restraint, 
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which was an essential component of fides.339 In order to maintain Rome’s political system, 
magistrates had to (or at least appear to) check their individual ambition. Restraint is particularly 
pertinent to the dictatorship, which was effectively the most power a single Roman could hold. 
The “self-restraint of the ancients” is one of Livy’s key lessons to readers.340 He wrote often 
about resignations, both enthusiastic and forced. As a result, we are able to track a variety of 
resignation scenarios, which in turn demonstrated the dictatorship’s fluctuating relationship to 
the people and the Senate.  
In the early Republic, most of Livy’s dictators accomplished their tasks quickly and 
decisively. A famous example is Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus, who resigned after just fifteen 
days in 458 BCE. He was appointed in response to the Aequian’s brazen violation of a recent 
peace treaty. They had sacked several Roman towns and a consul’s military encampment.341 
News of the attacks caused widespread panic in Rome. In the words of Livy, “the situation 
evidently called for a dictator,”342 Cincinnatus was in exile on the outskirts of Rome, working 
diligently on his farm, “digging a ditch, maybe, or ploughing.”343 Soon, an envoy reached the 
farm and asked him to take supreme command. Cincinnatus simply brushed the sweat from his 
brow and asked his wife to bring his toga.344 The newly-appointed dictator arrived in the city by 
morning. Cincinnatus promptly took command and prepared the populace for war. Within days, 
he led his soldiers into combat.345 Just over two weeks after being summoned from his farm, 
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Cincinnatus achieved victory, took the spoils, and resigned his dictatorship.346 While this story is 
closer to myth than historical reality, Cincinnatus nonetheless serves as a fair archetype for the 
expectations of a Roman dictator.347 An ideal appointee was meant to wield their power in 
service of the state, and surrender their office as soon as possible.  
 Livy told a myriad of similar stories in order to emphasize dictators’ restraint. In 418 
BCE, Livy wrote that Quintus Servilius Priscus achieved a great military victory and resigned 
after a term of one week.348 Later, there was Titus Quintus Cincinnatus, who resigned after just 
twenty days in 380 BCE. The simple news of his appointment was enough to unite Rome’s 
distraught plebeians and terrify the enemy.349 Livy told us that Mamercus Aemilius’s third 
dictatorship lasted just sixteen days, also providing him a military triumph.350 These stories were 
likely exaggerated but stressed the symbolic weight of the term limit. A dictator who quickly 
relinquished his power showed respect for the Republic and the institution. Republican politics 
were built on the idea that officials had an obligation to practice self-control and behave 
moderately.351 Especially in the early Republic, this helped the aristocracy to protect its 
supremacy. Honorable dictators continually expressed moderation, which made their substantial 
power easier to swallow. There are echoes of this in Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus’s famous story. 
When the dictator first entered the city, Livy described ordinary citizens, who gathered in wary 
crowds, “by no means so pleased to see the new dictator, as they thought his power excessive 
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and dreaded the way in which he was likely to use it.”352 By the end of his dictatorship, Livy 
portrayed Cincinnatus as unanimously adored.353 Emblematic exhibitions of restraint 
manipulated plebeians to accept the aristocratic status quo, at least temporarily.  
Resigning in protest served a similar function.354 In 434 BCE, Livy described Mamercus 
Aemilius’s second dictatorship. After an unproductive military effort, Mamercus decided to use 
his remaining term for domestic improvements.355 Reinforcing the dictator’s commitment to 
restraint, he rallied against the five-year term of censors.356 The dictator found the long term to 
be unjust, as “the greatest safeguard” of the Republic, was “that great powers should never 
remain long in the same hands.”357 His proposal to shrink the term to a year and a half was 
extremely popular with the populace and easily passed. Upon completion of the vote, Mamercus 
immediately resigned as a mark of his “‘disapproval of the extended tenure of power.’”358 Livy 
clearly showed a dictator who used his power to reaffirm Republican principles. Similarly, in 
494 BCE, a dictator resigned after the Senate refused to amend its policy on plebeian debt, which 
naturally won the dictator approval from the commons.359 Resignations were a convenient 
technique to bolster the dictatorship’s reputation among the people. In the case of these protest 
resignations, the dictators may have ironically strengthened their individual reputation, even at 
the expense of the Senate. 
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Nonetheless, not all dictators eagerly laid down their office. Livy included seven dictators 
who were forced to resign.360 It seems that a dictator could not be legally fired or truly obligated 
to leave office. He could, however, be strongly compelled to do so, especially by the Senate. As 
discussed, Livy wrote of six resignations due to faults in the auspices.361 These can be interpreted 
as either voluntary or compulsory. The remaining resignation was much closer to a dismissal. An 
odd appointment from the start, this dictator was Lucius Manlius, the disgraced dictator who was 
appointed for the nail ceremony in 363 BCE. He ignored his assigned religious task to seek war, 
causing backlash from the plebeian tribunes. Livy told us that he “either yielded to force or to a 
sense of shame and resigned the dictatorship.”362 Even after his resignation, the former dictator 
was put on trial. It is unclear why Lucius Manlius was selected for the dictatorship in the first 
place, as his reputation was poor. Besides his initial indiscretion, he imposed a detested levy, 
“was loathed for his violent temper,” and mistreated his son.363 Needless to say, he was 
unpopular. Lucius Manlius was not punished, but only because his blindly loyal son threatened 
suicide in retaliation for any charge against his father.364  
The entire case was extreme and underlined the strangeness of a dictator being obliged to 
resign. Livy may have also villainized Lucius Manlius to underline his dishonorable actions. 
Although Lucius Manlius probably had the imperium to conduct war, he defied the unofficial 
constraints and expectations of his appointment. Seeking military glory was selfish, not for the 
good of Rome. Notably, Livy depicted Manlius’s power being checked by the plebeian tribunes, 
who were tasked with defending the rights of the people. This dictatorship occurred after all 
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previously discussed resignations. So, Manlius’s indictment was representative of the people’s 
rising power. Plebeians still experienced significant oppression during this time. Yet, the people 
were able to impact “the thunderbolt of the dictatorship,” which revealed that changes were 
slowly beginning.365 In earlier years, dictators generally had full agency, as they resigned on 
their own terms. Manlius was essentially forced out of his office, which reflected subtle 
decreases in the aristocracy’s dominance.  
  
                                                            




By understanding the Roman dictatorship as a dynamic and practical component of the 
Republican political system, the office is demystified. While we remain unsure of many 
legalities and specifics, the dictatorship’s role is still traceable. As Livy succinctly described, it 
was “the usual practice in times of crisis.”366 Importantly, crises were not always military 
matters. As Rome’s emergencies changed, so did dictatorship. The early Roman Republic was an 
aristocracy, run by a largely “closed” system of wealthy families.367 Appointing a dictator was 
not a deviation from the existing power structure, but rather a vital emergency protocol. The 
appointment of a dictator was an effective solution for the specific crises of the time. A dictator 
calmed domestic riots, intimidated enemies, and streamlined military efforts, which at the same 
time reinforced aristocratic dominance. 
Significantly, the Republic began as a small agrarian city-state. Near the founding of the 
Republic, 25,000 to 40,000 Romans were living in a territory of less than 1,000 square 
kilometers, about three-quarters the size of modern-day Rome.368 Conflicts were also close to 
home, meaning the military was focused on fighting near-by battles. This meant a dictator could 
reach the field quickly. Dictators were appointed for largely local emergencies from a small and 
restrictive governing class. Early Republican officials largely earned their entry into politics by 
birthright. Subsequently, the dictatorship was also able to act as a stopgap for the amateurish 
politics of any underqualified magistrates. If the consuls of the year were performing poorly, a 
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dictator allowed the Republic to reinstate a trusted politician. This evolved as the ranks of the 
elite opened slightly.  
The shift away from a small patrician aristocracy may have increased the overall quality of 
Rome’s politicians and created a system that was less cohesive, but ultimately more stable (for a 
period of time).369 Not only was there a greater variety of offices, but there was also fiercer 
competition to obtain them.370 In reference to Camillus, Livy wrote, “Rome would never have 
need of a dictator if she had such men in office, men so united in heart, as ready to obey 
command, and contributing glory to the common stock rather than drawing it from their own 
interests.”371 Although political motivations are never so purely patriotic, perhaps such a change 
began to occur. 
Over the next few centuries, Rome expanded tremendously. Growing to the size of Delaware, 
Rome held over 5,000 kilometers and almost 350,000 citizens by 338 BCE.372 Inopportunely, we 
have lost Livy’s narrative for most of the third century BCE (about 291-222 BCE). Before the 
interruption, Livy ominously wrote that a 292 BCE plague, “was thought to be an evil omen.”373 
When his history resumed in 222 BCE, the Second Punic War was brewing just as both Rome 
and Carthage were “at the peak of their prosperity and power.”374 Livy implied that dictators had 
not been used for many years, although recent appointments were listed in certain fasti.375 By 
this time, Rome had swelled to about the size of Massachusetts, with 26,805 square kilometers 
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and 900,000 citizens. 376 During this “most memorable war in history,” Livy reported many 
peculiar uses of the dictatorship, including two simultaneous dictators and an “acting-dictator” 
appointed by the people.377 Rome was fighting stronger enemies, further from home, with more 
complex military operations.378 It follows that one of Rome’s oldest political institutions 
underwent modifications to suit an entirely different political landscape.  
The remaining question is why this adaptable institution eventually disappeared. While the 
Roman dictatorship offered exceptional flexibility, it was ultimately created for a bygone 
political system. The dictatorship’s irregular uses during the Second Punic War showed the 
furthest evolutionary limits of the dictatorship. By the end of the war, the Republic was operating 
under new offices and new systems that superseded the dictator. While Mommsen believed that 
dictatorships were discontinued because of public hatred, it is more likely that office was not 
needed.379 Rome’s emergencies were now large-scale wars, not nearby battles or domestic 
rioting. Opportunities for nondictatorial command positions also increased throughout the 
Republic. In many cases, longer term, less powerful commanders were more suited to the current 
conflicts.380 Praetorships and prorogations (extensions of command) may have also helped to 
replace dictatorships.381 Scipio Africanus’s famous campaigns in his namesake continent allowed 
him to hold power (as general or consul) for over a decade.382 Unlike a dictator, Scipio’s third 
century BCE mission was “not limited by a definite date.”383 Scipio was the hero of the Second 
Punic War, so a lengthier period proved to be useful.  
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The dictatorship was suited to increase efficiency for the small city-state of Rome, not the 
full-fledged Republic. By the third century BCE, the domination of one man was less practical. 
The Second Punic War also saw clearer laws and expectations on officials in the field, as they 
were greater in number and further from home.384 A dictator was far less manageable than 
magistrates with inferior power, which may have also contributed. The dictatorial appointments 
of the Second Punic War diverged from custom and appear anomalous, but perhaps only because 
we are missing a century of Rome’s progress in Livy. By understanding the greater arc of 
change, it is still evident that Rome had suitably altered the dictatorship, as well as their whole 
political framework. These various alterations in the Republic may have made dictators 
unnecessary, perhaps explaining why the position went out of use after 201 BCE.   
In other words, the dictatorship vanished for the same reasons it was trusted for multiple 
centuries. As Livy’s detailed narrative reflected, the Republic was a time of massive 
development and political innovation. As the sovereignty of the people was amplified and Rome 
itself grew, even fundamental concepts like imperium changed. Rome was able to expand and 
succeed because of its willingness to adjust old traditions to the constant evolutions of the state. 
The dictatorship had to be altered because Rome’s political structure had fundamentally 
changed, meaning the office ultimately outlived its usefulness.  
Consequently, there is also room to reconsider the divergent dictatorships of Sulla and 
Caesar. In 82 BCE, Lucius Cornelius Sulla was essentially granted a permanent dictatorship.385 
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From 49 to 44 BCE, Gaius Julius Caesar held four consecutive dictatorships, before officially 
becoming dictator perpetuo.386 Rome was no longer controlled by a small elite, which meant 
both late dictators were able to use mass support to enable individualistic power grabs. 387 
Whereas traditional dictators were trusted to act in the best interest of the state, Sulla and Caesar 
used popular sovereignty to reinstate kinglike rule.388 
Both of their dictatorships represented the kind of mob-rule that Livy disparaged. He spoke 
with contempt of Athenian democracy, critiquing that, “there is never any lack at Athens of 
tongues ready and willing to stir up the passions of the common people; this kind of oratory is 
nurtured by the applause of the mob in all free communities.” 389 Caesar and Sulla resembled 
Greek tyrants or even Roman kings,390 but not the traditional Republican dictatorship. Flower 
wrote that Romans saw tyranny as equivalent to “lawlessness,”391 which arguably characterized 
the largely extralegal rises of Sulla and Caesar. Emergency dictators were not meant to upset the 
balance of power, but to preserve the Republic amidst dire circumstances. Conversely, the later 
dictators sought to win all control for themselves. Nonetheless, these new formations of the 
dictatorship still reflected a changed political system; the old aristocracy of the Republic was 
utterly deteriorated, and true supreme rule could be seized with popular support. As a result, 
perhaps the convention of isolating these two dictators is flawed. I still find Sulla and Caesar to 
be distinct from the dictatorships considered in this investigation. Yet, Sulla and Caesar clearly 
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have a place in the lineage of the dictatorship. The implications of these abnormal dictatorships 
require further examination. Just as Livy’s dictators mirror the evolution of the early Republic’s 
aristocracy, Sulla and Caesar surely reflect the transformation and collapse of late Republican 
politics. 
I do not intend this study to offer a conclusive portrait of the dictatorship. Regrettably, many 
facts about dictators have been lost to time. Instead, I hope to offer a methodology for continuing 
our examination of the dictatorship. Many aspects of the office’s history are not challenged, 
often because the discipline is inclined to trust Mommsen’s word. The work of Lintott and 
Flower, cited often in this study, attempted to revise standard narratives of the Republic. I offer a 
modest imitation of this method, which is meant to illuminate gaps in research and point to 
topics that deserve further investigation. Livy’s narrative approach offers a unique window into 
the nuances of each dictatorship. While I have chosen Livy as a useful basis for this study, a 
similar methodology could be applied to any ancient historian, offering a different perspective on 
the dictatorship or any other political institution.  
Arguments that delve into the minutiae of the dictatorship often become prescriptive, a 
mistake which often disregards the remarkable adaptability of Roman politics. Scholars that see 
the dictatorship as exceptionally monarchial or undemocratic have often lost sight of the wider 
scope of Republican politics. The dictatorship must be considered in the context of Rome’s 
evolution from a small aristocratic state to a burgeoning world power which experimented with 
more inclusive politics. Close examination demonstrates that the dictatorship was not a political 
anomaly, but an effective tool of Roman government. Furthermore, this investigation highlights 
the problematic nature of representing Rome as anything near democratic. The Republic took 
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small steps towards popular sovereignty, yet the dictatorship persisted due to some glaringly 
aristocratic aspects of Rome’s Republican political structure.  
Despite conventional thought, the use of dictators was not remarkable or uniquely 
undemocratic, but consistent with Roman political practices.392 The Republic was able to persist 
for many centuries because it was responsive and constantly adjusted to changing circumstances. 
The dictatorship, an ancient and esteemed office, is a perfect representation of Rome’s ability to 
adapt while honoring their history. The Republic’s political development—especially Livy’s 
retelling of it—is characterized by tension between tradition and practical modifications.393 
Rigidly legalistic discussions of the dictatorship often fall short, because they attempt to 
condense centuries of innovation into neat official rules that simply did not exist. In the end, 
Livy’s dictators act as an ideal microcosm of the continual adaptation and complexity of the 
Republic’s constitution. 
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501 BCE 2. 18 Titus Lartius  
or other, like Manlius Valerius, 
Livy found his identity to be 
uncertain. 
496 BCE 2. 19-20 Aulus Postumius  
494 BCE 2. 30-31 Manlius Valerius  
458 BCE 3. 26-29 Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus  
First dictatorship (see also 439 
BCE) 
439 BCE 4. 13-16 Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus  
Second dictatorship (see also 458 
BCE) 
437 BCE 4. 17-20 Mamercus Aemilius  
First dictatorship (see also 434, 
426 BCE) 
435 BCE 4. 21-22 Aulus Servilis  
Surname is either Priscus or 
Structus, Livy is unsure. 
434 BCE 4. 23-4. 24 Mamercus Aemilius  
Second dictatorship (see also 437, 
426 BCE) 
431 BCE 4. 26-29 Aulus Postumius Tubertus  
426 BCE 4. 31-.34 Mamercus Aemilius  
Third dictatorship (see also 437, 
434 BCE) 
418 BCE 4. 46-47 Quintus Servilius Priscus  
408 BCE 4. 57 Publius Cornelius  
396 BCE 5. 19-23 Marcus Furius Camillus  
First dictatorship (see also 390, 
389, 368, 367 BCE) 
390 BCE 5. 46-55 Marcus Furius Camillus  
Second dictatorship (see also 396, 
389, 368, 367 BCE) 
389 BCE 6. 2-4 Marcus Furius Camillus  
Third dictatorship (see also 396, 
390, 368, 367 BCE) 
385 BCE 6. 11-16 Aulus Cornelius Cossus  
380 BCE 6. 28-29 Titus Quinctius Cincinnatus  
368 BCE 6. 38 Marcus Furius Camillus  
Fourth dictatorship (see also 396, 
390, 389, 367 BCE) 
368 BCE 6. 39-42 Publius Manlius  
367 BCE 6. 42 Marcus Furius Camillus  
Fifth dictatorship (see also 396, 
390, 389, 368 BCE) 
363 BCE 7. 3-4 Lucius Manlius Imperiosus  
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362 BCE 7 .6-8 Appius Claudius  
361 BCE 7. 9-.10 Titus Quinctius Poenus  
360 BCE 7. 11 Quintus Servilius Ahala  
358 BCE 7. 12-15 Gaius Sulpicius  
356-357 BCE 7. 17 Gaius Marcius Rutulus  
353 BCE 7. 19-21 Titus Manlius (Torquatus) 
First dictatorship (see also 348 
BCE) 
352 BCE 7. 20-22 Gaius Julius  
351 BCE 7. 22 Marcus Fabius  
350 BCE 7. 24-25 Lucius Furius Camillus  
First dictatorship (see also 347-345 
BCE) 
348 BCE 7. 26 Titus Manlius Torquatus 
Second dictatorship (see also 353 
BCE) 
347-345 BCE 7. 28 Lucius Furius Camillus  
Second dictatorship (see also 350 
BCE) 
347-345 BCE 7. 28 Publius Valerius Publicola  
342 BCE 7. 38-42 Marcus Valerius Corvus  
340 BCE 8. 12 Lucius Papirius Crassus  
339 BCE 8. 12 Quintus Publilius Philo  
338-337 BCE 8. 15 Gaius Claudius Inregillensis  
336-332 BCE 8. 16 Lucius Aemilius Mamercinus  
336-332 BCE 8. 17 Publius Cornelius Rufinus  
332 BCE 8. 17 Marcus Papirius Crassus  
332-331 BCE 8. 18  Gnaeus Quinctilius  
327 BCE 8. 23 Marcus Claudius Marcellus  
325 BCE 8. 29-37 Lucius Papirius Cursor  
First dictatorship (see also 310 
BCE) 
323-322 BCE 8. 38-40 Aulus Cornelius Arvina  
321 BCE 9. 7 Quintus Fabius Ambustus  
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321 BCE 9. 7 Marcus Aemilius Papus  
320-319 BCE 9. 15-16 Lucius Cornelius  
317-315 BCE 9. 21 Lucius Aemilius  
316-315 BCE 9. 22-24 Quintus Fabius  
314 BCE 9. 26 Gaius Maenius  
313-312 BCE 9. 28 Gaius Poetelius  
313-312 BCE 9. 29 Gaius Junius Babulcus 
First dictatorship (see also 302 
BCE) 
310 BCE 9. 38-40 Lucius Papirius Cursor  
Second dictatorship (see also 325 
BCE) 
306 BCE 9. 44 Publius Cornelius Scipio  
302 BCE 10. 1-2 Gaius Junius Babulcus  
Second dictatorship (see also 313-
312 BCE) 
302 BCE 10. 3-5 Marcus Valerius Maximus  
Break in Livy’s History 
217-216 BCE 22. 8- 32 Quintus Fabius Maximus 
Second dictatorship (as stated in 
Livy), “acting-dictator,” interregni 
causa 
216 BCE 22. 33 Lucius Venturius Philo  
216 BCE 22. 57-23. 31 Marcus Junius Pera  
216 BCE 23. 22-23 Marcus Fabius Buteo  
215 BCE 25. 2 Gaius Claudius Centho  
210 BCE 27. 5-6 Quintus Fulvius Flaccus  
207 BCE 27. 29-35 Titus Manlius Torquatus  
206 BCE 28. 1 Marcus Livius  
204 BCE 29. 10-11 Quintus Caecilius Metellus  
203 BCE 30. 24-26 Publius Sulpicius  




b. The Fasti 
Fasti were annalistic lists of elected officials, military triumphs, and other public events. 
Several of these records have survived, called the fasti annales. They were a key source and 
formed an outline of Roman politics for annalistic historians like Livy.394 Fasti were often 
engraved on monuments and arches. The Fasti Capitolini, one of the most significant records for 
Roman history (and dictators in particular), is thought to have been originally displayed in the 
Forum.395 It was rebuilt from fragments during the Renaissance, and now resides in Rome’s 
Capitoline Museum. The Fasti Capitolini has its own set of limitations, which exemplify the 
issues with relying on fasti (especially in studying the dictatorship). Despite providing a simple 
list of names and dates, fasti were likely created with specific political motivations, making this 
information undependable.396 The Fasti Capitolini was commissioned by Augustus during his 
reign for the purpose of public display, rewritten from old records.397 The list was reconstructed 
and intended as a monument, which certainly created considerable incentive for exaggeration or 
falsification. Most fasti were likely incomplete and compiled centuries after the fact, which 
means that they must be used carefully when trying to recreate the dictatorship’s earliest 
history.398  
Unfortunately, we know little about dictators during the gap in Livy from 291 to 219 BCE. 
Details about this time are largely uncertain, in part because Livy is a crucial source for early 
Roman history. Although the Fasti Capitolini lists just under twenty appointments, not all entries 
                                                            
394 Livy relied heavily on the fasti, so any faults in the annals may also be replicated in his work, see Forsythe, “The 
Beginnings of the Republic from 509 to 390 BC,” 316; Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 13; Armstrong, War and 
Society, 26-27; Livy perhaps preferred them to other sources, see Syme, “Livy and Augustus,” 69. 
395 Beard, The Roman Triumph, 61-62. 
396 Simpson, “The Original Site of the ‘Fasti Capitolini’,” 61; Drogula, Commanders & Command, 8-10, 16; 
Raaflaub, “Between Myth and History,” 134; Cohen, “The Origin of the Roman Dictatorship,” 302. 
397 Forsythe, “The Beginning of the Roman Republic,” 154. 
398 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 13, 218; Beard, The Roman Triumph, 61-62. 
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are reliable. It is uncertain how many dictatorships occurred during this break, although 
appointments almost certainly decreased. Several dictators from this period appear exclusively in 
the Fasti Capitolini, which has provoked questions about their authenticity.399 If we trust Livy, 
when his narrative resumed (just prior to the Second Punic War,) a long time had elapsed since 
the last dictator.400  
In 217 BCE, Livy wrote that “the government accordingly had recourse to the 
appointment of a dictator, a remedy which for many years had been neither wanted nor 
applied.”401 For several reasons, this is puzzling. For one, Livy implied that a long time has 
passed since the last dictatorship. Even more significantly, he wrote that “the length of time had 
almost blotted the meaning of the dictatorship from the minds of citizens and allies alike.”402 
This contradicts the Fasti Capitolini, as it lists dictatorships in 224, 231, and 264 BCE.403 Livy 
certainly believed much longer than seven years had elapsed. If we trust the Fasti Capitolini, the 
last dictator was appointed less than ten years prior. Although this was to hold elections, so 
perhaps Livy meant a dictator rei gerundae causa.404 Broughton made a general argument that 
we should trust Livy over the politically-guided fasti, although Livy certainly had his own 
objectives. Nonetheless, even within the Fasti Capitolini, dictators had become infrequent. So, 
perhaps we can conclude that the dictatorship was—to some extent—less prevalent.  
The fasti list many dictators throughout the Republic that Livy does not include, as well 
as differing names and dates. Primarily, I use the Fasti Capitolini to determine the official 
                                                            
399 Kaplan, "Religious Dictators,” 172-175. 
400 Livy 22. 8. 
401 Livy 22. 8. 
402 Livy 22. 11. Upon approaching the consul, Fabius “sent an officer to remind” the consul that “he much present 
himself to the dictator without lictors.” This reaffirms Livy’s assertion that there had not been a dictator in recent 
memory. 
403 Degrassi, Fasti Capitolini, 58-60. 
404 Degrassi, Fasti Capitolini, 58. 
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reasons for a dictator’s appointment, as Livy is often unclear.405 When it bears relevance, I 
discuss multiple instances in which Livy’s text contradicted the Fasti Capitolini. An in-depth 
comparison of Livy’s text to any fasti would undoubtedly produce findings worthy of a 
monograph. For the purposes of this study, I implement the fasti with caution and skepticism, 
and only as they apply to Livy’s narrative.406 
 
 
                                                            
405 Most relevant for Chapter III-d “Circumstances for Appointment.” 
406 This is good practice for all early Roman sources.  
